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The Globe aims to engage the undergraduate academic community in responsible global citizenship through the promotion of undergraduate international relations scholarship. The articles published in *The Globe* offer rich diversity in thought and conviction, allowing for active and vigorous debate on key policy issues in International Affairs.

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Letter from the Editor-In-Chief

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Dear Readers,

This is the first official time that I address you all as Editor-In-Chief of *The Globe*, the sole student-run undergraduate research journal in International Affairs at the George Washington University, and by extension, the Elliott School of International Affairs. It is with the utmost gratitude and enthusiasm that I am able to continue and build upon the legacy that my former Editor-in-Chief granted me. This is the first of many great successes at *The Globe* that I expect to share with you all.

This issue marks the culmination of three months of intense work during the Fall 2024 term, a period that has seen us grow and evolve in remarkable ways. We focused on welcoming an extensive new cohort of Associate Editors, implementing updated sensitivity, ethics, and readability guidelines to ensure the integrity of our publication, and training several newly appointed Senior Staff to lead the publication further into the 2024-25 academic year. Many of these projects were conducted remotely, and spanned borders around the world as many of our staffers continued their dedication to our journal while working or studying abroad.

I am proud to say that this issue represents yet another landmark in the history of *The Globe*. It is our first ever issue to include authors from beyond the George Washington University, and is our third publication since the journal's revival in 2023, including new article types that add caveats beyond a classic research article. These milestones are not just a testament to the hard work of our team but also to the ambition of our journal as we continue to rebuild our presence as a publication on-campus and beyond.

Over the past three months, we have had a myriad of successes in new initiatives. In October, we officially relaunched *The Compass*, our online short-form sister publication, providing a platform for GW students to publish accessible insights into current events from a geopolitical

perspective. In just a month's time, we were able to develop and rebuild our online platform to release over eight new articles in its initial publication. We have also expanded journal consultations to include special work sessions and office hours, allowing interested writers to talk directly with our Senior Staff on whether their work may fit the journal's scope. We also expanded our Writing and Editing Cohort to include over 60 staffers from all over the world. Furthermore, we have further expanded our submission policy and reach to welcome articles from any undergraduate student worldwide, bringing our first official article from beyond The George Washington University. This move marks a significant step in broadening our reach and enriching our content with diverse perspectives, while holding our journal to the highest level of quality and excellence in academic research.

Of course, one must note that as our team created this issue, the field of International Affairs continued to shift in unprecedented ways. The War in Ukraine has entered a new phase with a recent addition of North Korean troops to the Russian side. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues, exasperating ethnocultural differences around the world as Palestinians continue to suffer and face heightened turmoil along the Gaza Strip, while Israel has opened yet another front in Lebanon as it clashes with Hezbollah leaders. Meanwhile, South Korea and countries across Europe and the Middle East face a continuous threat to democracy and its leadership. In the United States, domestic politics have entered an unprecedented time of division as Donald Trump won the 2024 election and subsequently shifts federal power structures in the faces of his allies, making cabinet appointments that have left the people and Congress in turmoil. From the shores of the Americas and the Caribbean to the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, global politics continued to evolve in an era defined by fear, conflict, and turmoil, ever reminding us of the need for informed analysis and rigorous discourse, which *The Globe* strives to provide as it continues into the present and future.

As I carry out my continued duties as Editor-In-Chief, I do so knowing that this journal carries with it an important lesson in the ever-changing world of politics and international affairs. Purpose, drive, and progress is not carried out only by the torches that we pass to our successors, but also by the unlit torches we give light to, as we share our spark with others to let the light burn brighter together. As you read through this issue, I encourage you to engage deeply with the perspectives, lessons, and insights provided, and use the light it provides you to broaden your understanding and initiative in the field of international affairs.

Best Wishes,

Stephanie Van Ausdeln

Editor-In-Chief

Types of International Third-Party Mediators in Localized Conflicts: A Comparative Case Study

Author: Grigory Menshikov*

Abstract

Recent outbreaks of violence in the Middle East and Eastern Europe have reinvigorated global interest in peacebuilding. Some historical evidence suggests that peacebuilding is more successful if helped by a third-party facilitator. Still, such assertions are far from flawless. This article focuses on conflict resolution, examining how foreign moderation by a neutral actor may affect peace talks and future reconciliation. This qualitative study includes two cases: Israel against Palestine and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") against Sri Lanka. Each case examines two mediators, so the paper discusses four international mediators in total: the United Nations Organization, the United States, India, and Norway. The respective intermediaries each belong to different types of academic classification, face uniquely distinct challenges, and pursue varying agendas when intervening. Generally, this article is more critical of the presence of a foreign mediator in localized conflicts. Looking at Israel [vs. Palestine] and Sri Lanka [vs. LTTE] from a closer angle allows the conclusion to be drawn that any foreign intermediary in a conflict will be problematic to a varying degree of severity. In both the beginning and the end of the article, the consideration of alternative means of mediation, such as domestic

groups, as advocated by James Gibson, Paul Wehr, and John Lederach in their respective studies on South Africa and Central America is proposed, however these solutions should be expanded upon in a separate work since this paper focuses on disproving the assertion that international third-party mediation is a universal remedy for localized conflicts.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, facilitation, peace process, intermediaries, mediation

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Introduction

The opinion that the presence of a third party in a conflict is conducive to a successful mediation and long-lasting peace is widespread in the broader academic community.[1] Although the popularity of this scholarly opinion does not guarantee a unanimous consensus on the effects of third-party participation in conflicts, most political scientists agree that foreign-actor mediation has a net-positive effect on conflict resolution and violence reduction.[2] Logically, having a dispassionate side to the conflict should facilitate the possibility for mutual enemies to engage with each other and find common grounds for peace. However, while foreign intervention to resolve conflicts is generally considered a positive, it is not infallible. Realist theorists like John Mearsheimer and Hans Morgenthau express their concern over the great powers taking advantage of peace negotiations and using their newly gained influence to project their diplomatic dominance onto the global arena.[3] Even outside of the realist paradigm, peacemaking attempts by outsiders bear risks for all parties involved in the conflict, especially with UN peacekeeping and smaller states as mediators.[4] Only recently have academics begun to evaluate the various complexities that arise with third-party mediation efforts. It became apparent that the existence of an independent mediator does not necessarily account for progress in conflict resolution. The positive effects of

[1] Constantin Ruhe, "Impeding Fatal Violence Through Third-Party Diplomacy: The Effect of Mediation on Conflict Intensity," Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 4 (2021): 688, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320930072.

[2] Govinda Clayton and Han Dorussen, "The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 59, no. 2 (2022): 154, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076.

[3] Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996): 370, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040002007; Patrick M. Regan, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts," The Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): 754, https://doi.org/10.2307/2647647.

[4] Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 1 (1991): 6, https://www.jstor.org/stable/424189; John Steven Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States: Norway in Sri Lanka," Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 4 (2005): 387, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836705058225.

external mediation are not statistically proven. Instead, many intrinsic factors of the conflict (non-governmental interrelationships, effects on smaller communities, traditions, and imbued historical tensions) should be considered to determine the measures a mediator should implement to facilitate discourse between the belligerent sides.[5] Ultimately, much confusion remains in the field of conflict resolution due to the lack of established concepts, tendencies, and empirical evidence.[6] These reasons for insufficient academic clarity warrant resorting to case studies as the primary tool to investigate different aspects of third-party peacemaking.

This case study compares foreign intervention in the peace processes between Israel and Palestine and the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers. Different criteria of both conflicts will be explored in correspondence with the framework suggested by Marieke Kleiboer and then compared against the number of prevalent theories in international relations.[7] References to Kleiboer's article (1996) will occur repeatedly in this text, therefore this section provides a brief overview of its advantages in exploring conflict mediation. In short, Kleiboer's framework is an assembly of various theories across the peacebuilding field, juxtaposed against one another to highlight the best approach to the matter. She compares conflict resolution success in the contexts of 1) dispute characteristics, through ripeness, intensity, and nature of the issues; 2) disputant characteristics, such as their identities, cohesiveness, regimes, motivations, histories, and power balance; 3) mediator characteristics, namely, the mediator's impartiality, leverage, and status; and 4) additional diplomatic pressure. In each of these four sections, Kleiboer reviews mutually

[5] Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 4 (1993): 676, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002793037004005.

[6] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 376.

[7] Ibid., 362, 364, 368.

opposing outtakes. This decision helps the reader be more flexible about what theses to adhere to and allows the avoidance of taking a specific side. Additionally, Kleiboer proposes a choice between four "proto theories" in mediation for further examination: mediation as power brokerage (realist perspective), as domination (structuralist perspective), as political problem-solving (another realist perspective), or as re-establishing social relationships (critical theory perspective).[8] As previously noted, the lack of established formulas in the field justifies looking at several "proto theories" at once. A significant benefit of Kleiboer's work is that it is more descriptive than argumentative, therefore providing a perfect foundation for further discussions. Thus, while it may be appropriate to hint at the realist argument under some circumstances, other situations will likely require an alternative approach.

While avoiding excessive pessimism, it is reasonable to be skeptical about third-party involvement in international conflicts as a whole. For example, echoing (but not entirely agreeing with) the realists Paul Wehr and John Lederach, mediators "from within" the conflict are more effective peacemakers than the international community.[9] James Gibson highlights this notion in his research on South African reconciliation; one of the alternative views in his work emphasizes the importance of endogeneity in coming to terms after the apartheid.[10] However, in this comparative case study context, Gibson's work is quite nuanced. Post-apartheid reconciliation was an entirely domestic South African process. Reconciliation efforts heavily relied on the already

[8] Ibid., 379.

[9] Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach, "Mediating Conflict in Central America," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 1 (1991): 87, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343391028001009.

[10] James L. Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3 (2006): 420, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706287115.

existing social institutions and a "rule of law" culture.[11] In scenarios where conflicts are more intense and polarized, the institutions, regulations, and resources needed for endogenous resolution are either incompatible (if the conflict is international) or nonexistent. These endogeneity-related nuances are important because the effects of third-party engagement on peacemaking and resolution may significantly differ for domestic and international processes.[12]

The lack of clarity in statistical trends that differentiate the effects of a third-party presence on civil versus global conflicts informed the selection of cases for this paper. Therefore, at a glance, the conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka do not share many commonalities, thereby enriching the comparison by providing a more extensive scope of characteristics for analysis.

Case One: Israel and Palestine

It is well-known that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of (if not) the oldest ongoing political clashes on the planet. Its origins are historically and morally complex, rooted in contested territory, sovereignty, and growing discrimination. The key condition for these disputes is the alleged impossibility of a Jewish democracy to incorporate Palestinian Arabs successfully and remain either Jewish or a democracy (the so-called "Israel's trilemma").[13] Crucially, blame for the continuation of violence must not be solely attributed to a particular side. Both sides have regularly contributed to the conflict by perpetuating cruelty and oppression and struggling with mutual recognition. During the more violent periods of Israeli-Palestinian history, the two sides have actively resorted to international mediation. In 1949, the third parties engaged in the mediation

[11] Ibid., 422.

[12] Atilla M. Öner et al., "Understanding the Interactions Between International and Domestic Conflicts: The Case of Turkey and Greece," Journal of European Theoretical and Applied Studies 1, no. 1 (2013): 125.

[13] Michael Barnett et al., "Israel's One-State Reality: It's Time to Give Up on the Two-State Solution," Foreign Affairs 102, no. 3 (2023): 123–124, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israel-palestine-one-state-solution

were Jordan and the United Nations. In the 1970s, the United States replaced the UN as the primary mediator. In the 1990s, Norway joined, helping liaise between the two parties to allow for the signing of the Oslo Accords, a pair of interim agreements between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel signed in Washington, D.C. and Taba, Egypt in 1993 and 1995 respectively.[14] While the negotiations and agreement in Norway were significant milestones for the peace process, the world saw a gradual worsening of the situation several years later.[15] Kleiboer's criteria for estimating the type of conflict within various substructures will be used to explain this gradual decline.

From the suggested framework, it is possible to conclude that the conflict between Israel and Palestine was not "ripe" enough for resolution in the wake of the Oslo process,[16] nor were the sides fully ready for or committed to peace after all the violent confrontations preceding Oslo. The conflict continues to experience varying intensities, and the issues at stake pertain mainly to territorial sovereignty and national security.[17] As for the actors, they have historically struggled to maintain a friendly relationship, lacking the motivation to engage in diplomatic talks.[18] The existing conditions for external mediation were further complicated by the two sides' striking disparity in regimes and lack of cohesiveness: a democratic versus non-democratic state, the constant infighting between the Palestinian political and militant groups to represent all

[14] Jørgen Jensehaugen, "Excluded Palestinians: Mediator Gatekeeping in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," The Peace Research Institute Oslo, FAIR Case Brief no. 2 (2022): 5, 7, https://www.prio.org/publications/12951.

[15] Oren Barak, "The Failure of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process, 1993–2000," Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (2005): 720, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305057889.

[16] Ibid., 723.

[17] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 362.

[18] Benjamin Brown, "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Source of the Problem is the Source of the Solution," World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 23, no. 3 (2019): 61, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48531050.

Palestinians, and fluctuating degrees of bellicosity and peacefulness within Israeli governments.[19] Lastly, another critical factor for the viability of third-party intervention is a power imbalance between the sides. Originally, Palestinians were much stronger than Israelis because they had the support of the Arab states and the Soviet Union. Later, the power distribution shifted in favor of Israel, who befriended the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance.[20]

As aforementioned, the two leading third-party mediators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were the United Nations and the United States. It is reasonable to discuss each of these intermediaries separately. The UN's role as an international mediator is highly criticized, specifically in terms of conflict resolution between Israel and Palestine. The Organization has achieved the short-term goal of ending the war but also set up a ticking time bomb by misrepresenting one of the core conflict parties. First, the partition plans offered by the United Nations did not account for Palestine as a sovereign entity.[21] Second, these plans were generally unfair to the Arab population of the Holy Land– if being examined from a revisionist perspective.[22] Notably, these arrangements by the UN did not bear malicious intent. Instead, representatives of the Organization had to mediate strictly abiding by the established restrictions and without sufficient leverage, as the so-called "weak mediators."[23] Indeed, both in politics and academia, the United Nations is considered a less-than-successful agent in resolving violent political disputes.

[19] Pere Vilanova, "Political and Social Recomposition in Israel and Palestine," IEMed. (2009): 198–199.

[20] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books 28, no. 6 (2006): 2.

[21] Jensehaugen, Excluded Palestinians, 5.

[22] Lorenzo Kamel, "Framing the Partition Plan for Palestine," Cairo Review of Global Affairs (2022): 76.

[23] Jensehaugen, Excluded Palestinians, 6.

Even though the Organization is fairly impartial, it lacks the resources necessary to sustain its mediation efforts.[24]

Alternatively, the disputants can opt-in for great power mediation, which has resources but usually lacks impartiality. How did the United States perform as the mediator between Israel and Palestine? According to relatively neutral scientists and revisionist activists, the US exacerbated tensions more than the United Nations.[25] The US, namely Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, purposely excluded Palestinians from the peace talks for years to come and thus arguably prolonged the conflict.[26] Kissinger developed— and easily enforced– negotiation terms favorable to America's ally, Israel. Evidently, the problems of conflict resolution by great powers ("manipulative mediators") pertain to the increased likelihood of power brokerage and overlooking long-term peace as the end goal.[27] Ideally, belligerents would select a mediator that is both comparably geopolitically disinterested and powerful enough to maintain the peacemaking efforts. It is unclear what agents possess these particular characteristics in this case.

Case Two: Sri Lanka

While the underlying central causes of the civil war in Sri Lanka stem from centuries ago, the essential premise of this conflict is relatively fresh. The Sri Lankan Civil War broke out after numerous pogroms against the Tamil minority, as well as persistent political targeting of the

[24] Saadia Touval, "Why the U.N. Fails: It Cannot Mediate," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 5 (1994): 52, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1994-09-01/why-un-fails-it-cannot-mediate.

[25] Barak, "The Failure of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process," 732; Rashid Khalidi, "The United States and Palestine: Understanding Seven Decades of Failed American Policy," The Cairo Review of Global Affairs (2015): 65.

[26] Jensehaugen, Excluded Palestinians, 8.

[27] William I. Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics," Journal of Social Issues 41, no. 2 (1985): 32, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1985.tb00853.x.

Tamils by the Sinhalese-controlled governments. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a Tamil militant group that emerged in response to political discrimination and violent attacks against Tamils.[28] The war has not attracted as much international attention as many other conflicts around the globe, hence there were not many incentives for potential third-party peacemakers to intervene. There was an unsuccessful mediation attempt by India, which will be discussed further in the paper, and a more ambiguous one by Norway two decades later.[29] After Norway interfered, the Sri Lankan Civil War ended, but did so violently– the government of Sri Lanka defeated the Tamil Tigers militarily. The conceptual foundations for the Tamil insurgency remained in place, albeit in a somewhat altered shape.[30] Before determining the nature of the war in Sri Lanka per Kleiboer's measurements, it is sensible to highlight a caveat that her set of dispute characteristics may work differently for intrastate conflicts than for international ones.[31] Nonetheless, Kleiboer's analysis criteria do not appear inapplicable to domestic conflicts and can still be used to analyze insurgencies, like in Sri Lanka. To smooth things over, one only has to proceed with consideration for internal context. The war in Sri Lanka continued for over two decades, and such a lasting duration usually impedes preconditions for ripeness.[32] However, by the early 2000s, the bellicose sides had achieved "the mutually hurting stalemate" that increased ripeness.[33] The disputes

[28] Damien Kingsbury, Separatism and the State (Taylor & Francis, 2021), 54.

[29] Jonathan Goodhand et al., "Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009," Norad Evaluation Department (2011): 129.

[30] Kalyani Thurairajah, "'Who are we without the war?': The evolution of the Tamil ethnic identity in post-conflict Sri Lanka," Ethnicities 20, no. 3 (2020): 579, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796819846960.

[31] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 361; Paul R. Hensel, "The More Things Change...: Recognizing and Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science 19, no. 1 (2002): 32, https://doi.org/10.1177/073889420201900104.

[32] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 363.

[33] Shammika Hasantha Dehiwala Liyana Aratchchige, "Mediation Theory and Norway's Facilitation Role in the Sri Lankan Conflict," Asian Cultural Studies 35 (2009): 302.

remained intense and were often identified as a full-scale war.[34] Conceivably, the nature of the issues fueling the Sri Lankan conflict is not too profound; the Sinhalese and Tamils have been cohabiting in Ceylon for centuries, exerting cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic influence on each other.[35] The identity-based violence only escalated as a result of king-making and subsequent neglect of the due decolonization process by the British.[36]

Under Rajiv Gandhi, India had undertaken a failed peacekeeping initiative to reduce the tensions in the neighboring country. Not only did India not achieve lasting peace or armistice for the belligerents, but the Indian military disastrously lost more than 1,000 troops in battles against LTTE.[37] In 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Sri Lankan Tamil suicide bomber. Therefore during the subsequent stages of the conflict, the Indian government changed its stance and indirectly promoted violence by supporting Sri Lankan military efforts against the Tigers.[38] The abortive Indian peacemaking effort contributes to the argument that great powers serve as poor mediators. By all means, India was perceived as a powerful mediator– at least in South Asia. New Delhi had both leverage and interest in the events in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, India is skilled in

[34] Mohamed Anifa Mohamed Fowsar, "Third-Party Mediation in Sri Lanka's Peace Attempts: A Study on the Role of Norwegian Mediation," Journal of Politics and Law 13, no. 3 (2020): 31, https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v13n3p30; Sumit Ganguly, "Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War," Daedalus 147, no. 1 (2018): 81, 85, https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00475.

[35] Aratchchige, "Mediation Theory and Norway's Facilitation Role in the Sri Lankan Conflict," 299.

[36] Ganguly, "Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War," 79.

[37] Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 389; Sandra Destradi, "India and Sri Lanka's Civil War: The Failure of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia," Asian Survey 52, no. 3 (2012): 601, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.3.595.

[38] Destradi, "India and Sri Lanka's Civil War," 605.

diplomacy and possesses abundant peacemaking resources.[39] It is possible to partly explain the Indian failure in Sri Lanka by accounting for India's regional player bias and use of arms.[40] In contrast to India, Norway is small, has no significant strategic interests in South Asia, and has never deployed soldiers to the war-torn region. As opposed to a "manipulative mediator," Norway was a "facilitative" one.[41] Although the Norwegian peacemaking initiative did not reach the ultimate goal of complete conflict resolution, it achieved several impressive milestones along the way, for example the 2002 ceasefire agreement and the Oslo Declaration.[42] The relevant criticisms of Norway as an intermediary are mainly based on contextual problems that the Norwegian team was physically unable to solve, such as the continuing violence, unheard voices of certain conflict factions, and lack of local communal engagement in the peace process. Norway had to consider the needs and interests of multiple political groups in a highly volatile area and withstand pressure from many involved actors.[43] In addition to this pressure, the unassuming, facilitative nature of the Norwegian involvement placed many procedural obstacles on the path to peace, for instance the Norwegians had to wait for the changing South Asian governments to accept their mediator role in the conflict. Besides, Norway could not involve any civil society groups in the talks because of

[39] Milena Dieckhoff, "International Mediation: A Specific Diplomatic Tool for Emerging Countries?" European Review of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2014): 111, 119, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593338; Ganguly, "Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War," 81.

[40] Katja Favretto, "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias," American Political Science Review 103, no. 2 (2009): 253, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409090236.

[41] Aratchchige, "Mediation Theory and Norway's Facilitation Role in the Sri Lankan Conflict," 303.

[42] Fowsar, "Third-Party Mediation in Sri Lanka's Peace Attempts," 35; Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 396.

[43] Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 395–396.

their top-down structure and shortage of contact points between belligerents on a "grassroots" level.[44]

Synthesis and Discussion

The cases of Israel-Palestine and Sri Lanka offer four different examples of foreign third-party mediators. This selection concerns the degree of leverage a peacemaker should have, whether impartiality matters for a peacemaking agent, and how vital the context of a conflict is. Per Fisher and Keashly's classification, the United States and India are "powerful" mediators in this study's sample, and the United Nations and Norway are "pure" mediators.[45] As this paper previously noted, the choice of studied cases expands the range of confounding variables for analysis. The presence of the UN in the selection makes it possible to examine a non-governmental mediation and evaluate peacemaking by the international community as a whole. Having India and the United States among the subjects allows accounting for global and regional interests. Norway is a telling example of third-party mediation by a small state. The bottom line is that neither the UN, the US, India, nor Norway succeeded in fully resolving their respective conflicts. However, their degrees of success varied. Mediation by India failed, likely because of the lack of impartiality and continuous deployment of military forces. The importance of impartiality for mediation is highlighted by many scholars, such as Oran Young and Hizkias Assefa.[46] If a powerful mediator like India engages in military coercion, it tends to make at least one of the disputants reluctant to make peaceful concessions.[47] Still, the Indian failure is contradicted by the comparably definitive

[44] Ibid., 397–398.

[45] Siniša Vuković, "Soft Power, Bias and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation," International Negotiation 20, no. 3 (2015): 416, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341315.

[46] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 369.

[47] Favretto, "Should Peacemakers Take Sides?" 259.

American interference in Israel. Besides, academics like Jacob Bercovitch and Saadia Touval offer numerous works that disprove the positive relationship between a mediator's impartiality and trustworthiness.[48] It is true that during the Norwegian involvement in the Sri Lankan Civil War, Norway, a strategically disinterested actor, was berated by both belligerents for their attempts to retain the middle ground.[49] Furthermore, besides the hypothetical link between a mediator's impartiality and trustworthiness, there is another one between a mediator's impartiality and leverage.

Logically, mediation by smaller states tends to be more dispassionate. However, smaller states also have fewer resources to sustain their peacekeeping efforts. Small countries' leverage on the conflicting sides is predominantly immaterial and "trust-based."[50] On the other hand, the United Nations, also an impartial actor yet seemingly more powerful than any small state, often does not have much leverage for successful conflict resolution either. The explanation for the UN's lack of leverage is different from that for the smaller countries. While the latter may not have enough peacekeeping resources because of their size, the Organization's problem originates in great power clashes within the General Assembly and Secretariat.[51] In the meantime, great powers do not experience any material or immaterial leverage shortage. From this arrangement, Kleiboer concludes that while less biased intermediaries do not need excessive political and economic power to manage peace processes, sufficient leverage is crucial for third-party actors with strategic

[48] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 369.

[49] Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 393–395.

[50] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 371.

[51] Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton University Press, 1967), 322.

interests.[52] Some other conflict theorists, including Andrew Kydd, Touval, and William Zartman, identify impartiality as an overall secondary resolution factor to leverage. In other words, they say an interested and more powerful mediator will do better than a disinterested and weaker one.[53] Nevertheless, this claim can be contradicted by the disparity in the results of American and Indian peacemaking engagement in Israel and Sri Lanka, respectively. This contradiction brings the study discussion to its next point – the importance of context. Belligerents and third-party mediators are not insulated from the rest of the world and are frequently subjected to external (or internal) influences.[54] Thus, the growing tensions in Tamil Nadu negatively impacted Indian peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka.[55] Indian assistance to the Rajapaksa government therefore undermined the Norwegian peacemaking initiative.[56] Arguably, the Iranian funding of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Middle-Eastern paramilitary groups destroys any possibility for the resumption of peaceful negotiations between Israel and Palestine, no matter who the third party intermediary is.[57] The crucial role of context in conflict mediation is more axiomatic.[58]

[52] Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 372.

[53] Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, "Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts," Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 320, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313512223.

[54] Bercovitch, "International Mediation," 4; Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 373–374.

[55] Ganguly, "Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War," 81–82.

[56] Destradi, "India and Sri Lanka's Civil War," 596.

[57] Karim Sadjadpour and Benham Ben Taleblu, "Iran in the Middle East: Leveraging Chaos (Policy Brief)," Foundation for International Affairs and Global Dialogue, no. 202 (2015): 2.

[58] Bercovitch and Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation," 688.

Conclusion

There is still much work ahead regarding the research on third-party mediation. This work will take a long time because most pertinent studies are carried out case-by-case rather than by establishing trends. However, at this point, the academic community has developed an array of accurate frameworks to classify conflicts and intermediaries. With the example of four third-party intermediaries of different types and calibers, this case study tries to prove or disprove these classifications and find possible loopholes in the applied conflict resolution theories.

To conclude, first and foremost, there is no (and never will be) perfect formula for peace. Secondly, rare combinations of impartiality, leverage, and context exist sometimes allow for fully successful mediation. Nevertheless, such arrangements depend more on luck than theory and practical measures. The last conclusion is that the scholarly community can still counter this prevalence of luck in the field of conflict resolution. To do so, academics should pay more attention to the concept of "combined mediation efforts" suggested by Lederach and Wehr in their study on Central America and the endogeneity argument made by Gibson. The key to success for foreign intermediaries can lie in coordination with trusted domestic actors.[59] One of the core problems with external peacemaking is the mediators' inability to comprehend the local orders and customs. This unawareness and the imposition of foreign will without consideration for the existing societal mechanisms hinder all prospects for long-lasting peace. Sacrificing local needs to the worldview of peacemakers might create a breeding ground for exclusion and misunderstanding, which in turn may evolve into another full-scale violent conflict. The lack of collaboration with the locals also hurts the intermediaries, as their involvement often makes them engage in unsolicited and costly

[59] Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," 420; Lederach and Wehr, "Mediating Conflict in Central America," 88.

nation-building. Historical evidence suggests that the established peace was long-lasting and stable when larger autonomy and trust were given to the local communities during peace processes.[60] In summary, this paper confirms that a possible way to increase the probability of a successful peacemaking outcome is to increase local representation.

[60] Brandon Kendhammer and Rachel Sullivan, "Peacebuilding Needs Local Partners – But How Do You Define 'Local'?" United States Institute of Peace, (2022), https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/peacebuilding-needs-local-partners-how-do-you-define-local.

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A Comprehensive Assessment of Female Genital Mutilation Expertise Among Western Healthcare Professionals

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Abstract

The practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) is detrimental to the psychological and physical health of millions of women around the globe. Women who reside in low-income nations, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, have been subjected to this type of practice, and it has yielded consequences that have helped to settle that the practice of FGM is recognized as not only a violation of female autonomy, but also a direct infringement of basic universal human rights. With the recent increase in the migration of women who have undergone FGM from low-income nations to high-income Western nations, the role of healthcare professionals in the latter has become increasingly vital in the effort to ensure that migrant women are aware of the dangerous health outcomes of the practice. This research paper will aim to assess the FGM-related expertise level of healthcare providers in Western societies. In order to address the lack of Western healthcare expertise on female genital mutilation, it is imperative that healthcare systems across various free-thinking and innovative Western societies are enhancing various training programs that would properly educate healthcare providers on addressing the negative consequences of female genital mutilation. In particular, these educational programs should include PowerPoint presentations or online training

modules that would help to give more comprehensive information to healthcare providers about specific FGM types and resulting health complications. As a result of these sorts of interventions, healthcare professionals would be provided with an increased capacity of knowledge regarding the matter of the issue. Through this enhanced sense of education on FGM, women who have previously experienced the practice in their native countries would be better equipped to combat FGM health complications with higher quality healthcare in the West.

Keywords: Female Genital Mutilation, Western Healthcare Professionals, migrant women, health complications, knowledge, experience, attitude, educational interventions

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Scope of the Problem[1]

Female Genital Mutilation, Classifications, & Resulting Complications

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is referred to as the practice of removing part or all of the external female genitalia for non-medical reasons.[2] On a global scale, FGM has been performed on over 200 million females from 31 countries across the Middle East, Africa and Asia, with more than half of those females living in low-income countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia.[3] FGM is considered to be an upheld social norm that no woman residing within such countries can reject,[4] as the justifications to inflict this practice on females can be simplified to include preserving premarital virginity and ensuring social acceptance for women within their societies. Societies that carry out FGM procedures rationalize that removing parts of the female genatilia will prevent females from engaging in sexual intercourse before marriage, a traditional norm that is heavily emphasized within their societies. Additionally, FGM is believed to provide a pathway towards social integration for females within patriarchal societies that otherwise would degrade them as second-class citizens if they did not undergo the procedures of the practice. There are four different types of procedures that are carried out within FGM according to the World Health

[1]This paper was originally submitted for UW 1020: Writing Science and Health: Women's Health as a Point of Inquiry, taught by Dr. Jameta Nicole Barlow at the George Washington University. It has since been revised and expanded for The Globe.

[2]World Health Organization, "Eliminating female genital mutilation: an interagency statement," (2008): 1, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241596442.

[3]Alessandro Libretti et al., "Female genital mutilation/cutting: going beyond urogynecologic complications and obstetric outcomes," Archives of Gynecology and Obstetrics 308, no. 4 (2023): https://doi.org/10.1007/s00404-023-06929-6.

[4]A. J. Dawson et al., "Midwives' experiences of caring for women with female genital mutilation: insights and ways forward for practice in Australia," Women and Birth 28, no. 3 (2015): https://www.clinicalkey.com/nursing/#!/content/playContent/1-s2.0-S1871519215000098.

Organization (WHO):[5] Clitoridectomy (type one) comprises the partial or total removal of the glans clitoris. Excision (type two) involves the partial or total removal of the glans clitoris and the labia minora, with or without the removal of the labia majora. Infibulation (type three) is the closing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a covering seal, sometimes in the form of stitching the labia minora or majora. Lastly, type four encompasses all other harmful procedures such as piercing, pricking, incising, scraping, and much more.

As a result of carrying out these procedures, women who have been subjected to FGM suffer a wide array of physical health complications, some of which include acute pain, genital tissue swelling, shock, bleeding, ulcers, and death, as well as chronic vaginal and pelvic infections, scarring and keloids, urinary problems, menstrual disorders, infertility, and pregnancy complications.[6] From a psychological lens, FGM has played a huge role in devastating the mental health of women vulnerable to the practice, ultimately leading to complications like depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, low sexual desire, and psychosis.[7]

Global Migration Trend of FGM Women from Low-Income to High-Income Nations

Recent studies have demonstrated a global trend of women who have experienced FGM migrating from certain low-income countries to high-income countries situated in the West, which has increased Western healthcare professionals' exposure to female patients with FGM and has raised awareness about the negative aspects of the practice in high-income countries as well. For example, during the 1990s and the early 2000s, there was an enormous increase in the number of

[5]Libretti et al.,"Female genital mutilation."

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

migrant women who have undergone FGM residing in Spain, who originally migrated from West African nations such as Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea that frequently practice FGM.[8] From the time this study was published in 2018, there were 69,086 migrant women who have experienced FGM who lived in Spain, which represented a 5.2% population increase from 2012.[9] Clinicians working within the United Kingdom have also experienced a higher migration rate of women who have undergone FGM; in 2011, a reported estimate of 137,000 migrant women and girls who have experienced FGM have been permanently residing within the UK, representing a prevalence rate of 4.8 per 1000 population,[10] a statistic that should signify a major problem for the healthcare practitioners of that country.

Western Knowledge, Experience, & Attitude Towards FGM

Healthcare professionals in the West hold very limited knowledge and awareness about FGM and its resulting complications. For instance, in a survey of 54 United States-based female pelvic and reconstructive surgeons, less than 15% claimed to be feeling self-assured in recognizing FGM complications and discussing them with their patient, while 24% of them were actually able to identify all of the four types of FGM in clinical representation.[11] These low proportions of surgeons who specialize in providing medical sexual health care to females but lack the ability to discern particular FGM procedures and their resulting complications highlights a systematic

[8]Alba González-Timoneda et al., "Knowledge, attitudes and practices of primary healthcare professionals to female genital mutilation in Valencia, Spain: are we ready for this challenge?," BMC Health Services Research 18 (2018): 1-13, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-018-3396-z.

[9]González-Timoneda et al., "Knowledge, attitudes and practices," 1-13.

[10]Michelle Elizabeth Robinson et al., "Knowledge, attitudes, and practice of female genital mutilation and cutting: an observational cross-sectional study in English primary care (FGM/C Study)," BJGP Open 7, no. 3 (2023): https://doi.org/10.3399/BJGPO.2023.0005.

[11]Libretti et al., "Female genital mutilation."

knowledge gap of the practice within the US healthcare system that further exacerbates the ineffective care already provided to female migrants with FGM. In a London study of midwives and doctors who attend childbirths, only 4% of them were able to correctly identify the different classifications of FGM – which is significantly lower than the percentage of US surgeons who were able to classify the FGM procedures in the previous study. Furthermore, 45% of those practitioners held poor knowledge regarding the correct guidelines and procedures that are associated with the deinfibulation (a medical approach that reverses the procedure of infibulation) of female patients during child labor.[12] The study underscores that nearly half of these health practitioners cannot effectively utilize these methods in ways that remedy certain FGM complications in the event their female patients are expected to go into labor. This proves to be problematic for female migrants who are nearing the end of their pregnancy cycle and remain vulnerable to the complications of FGM that could make child delivery much more difficult for them. In Spain, despite there being three different types of FGM protocols and guidelines to follow in the event that health professionals are tasked to identify and care for women who have undergone FGM in the past, a midwife who works for a primary care facility in the province of Seville claimed that she never recalled there being an FGM protocol to follow.[13] This inability to remember medical protocols related to FGM may generally point to a lack of enforcement of these protocols within the Spanish healthcare system, which in turn leaves female migrants with FGM

[12]Yvonne Zurynski et al., "Female genital mutilation and cutting: a systematic literature review of health professionals' knowledge, attitudes and clinical practice," BMC International Health and Human Rights 15 (2015): 1-18, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12914-015-0070-y.

[13]María Reig-Alcaraz, José Siles-González, and Carmen Solano-Ruiz, "A mixed-method synthesis of knowledge, experiences and attitudes of health professionals to Female Genital Mutilation," Journal of Advanced Nursing 72, no. 2 (2015): https://doi.org/10.1111/jan.12823.

becoming more alienated within a developed healthcare system they sought help from in the first place.

Studies have also demonstrated a variation in the proportion of Western health professionals who had experience meeting with an FGM female patient. For instance, 71% of healthcare professionals in central and southern Italy have claimed to have never met or assisted a woman with FGM, despite working in an asylum seeker facility where the likelihood of encountering migrants from low-income nations who practice FGM is high.[14] In the event that healthcare professionals in Italy are tasked to care for female migrants with FGM, this statistic casts major doubt on the fact that medical care in Italy can be tailored to meet the needs of female migrants with FGM if medical practitioners in that country were never directly encountering these types of patients in the past. In contrast to this, 56% of midwives from the UK have had experience with caring for a female patient with FGM complications.[15]

In consensus, Western healthcare practitioners do have an overwhelmingly negative view about FGM; only 2% of Belgian doctors of 344 surveyed believed that the practice should be held with high esteem due to the cultural and religious reasons behind carrying it out,[16] which in approximate numbers is nearly 7 doctors of that sample size. To add on to this, in a study of 48 Australian midwives, the second focus discussion group of midwives have reportedly referred to FGM as an inhumane practice, as well as a subcategory of sexual abuse.[17] The great extent to

[14]Zurynski et al., "Female genital mutilation and cutting," 1-18.

[15]Brooke Sheerin, Emma Jefferson, and Yan-Shing Chang, "Female genital mutilation in high-income countries: knowledge and experience among health professionals," British Journal of Nursing 32, no. 3 (2023): 100-106, https://www.clinicalkey.com/nursing/#!/content/playContent/1-s2.0-S1871519215000098.

[16]Zurynski et al., "Female genital mutilation and cutting," 1-18.

[17]Dawson et al., "Midwives' experiences."

which medical professionals from countries in the Western world view the practice of FGM quite unfavorably is a confirmation that an improved Western healthcare system must be put in place. This healthcare system would not only be able to condemn the practice as a societal taboo, but destigmatize it in a way that would allow the emigrating population of females with FGM to feel more inclined to reach out for medical care that would adequately address their health complications, something that the dehumanizing social pressure of their home countries could never ease for them.

My Philosophy of Science

My approach to this major health issue largely stems from my identity as a first-generation American. Unfortunately, this horrific practice has gone on to victimize women such as my own mother, who was born and raised in Egypt, a country where FGM is a commonly practiced norm. Egyptian society can further be characterized as a strictly religious society that treats the average female as second to their male counterpart; the extent to which women like my mother have the power to speak out against the true barbarism of FGM is very minimal, as the ability to manipulate the female mind into believing that this type of practice is medically beneficial and religiously condoned is put into the hands of prejudiced, intolerable men.

As an American-born citizen, I have been raised to honor the privilege of being able to question the ethics of such a practice, falsify every lie that has been propagated about the practice, and raise awareness about the inhumane nature of FGM. In essence, I have been able to approach the practice of FGM from two sides of my first-generation American identity; at one end, I have my mother's FGM experiences in Egypt, which has allowed me to hold the utmost empathy for all women who have lived through the same experience. On the other end, I have my American-made mindset, one that is ingrained with the powerful liberal ideal of inquiring out of curiosity, which has helped me to recognize the evils of this practice and understand that with the power that I possess comes the responsibility to bring justice to all the women who have suffered for too long under the practice of FGM.

Policy Alternatives

Successful Educational Interventions

With the knowledge, experience, and attitudes of Western healthcare professionals having already been established, the need for specific educational interventions to help improve their mastery of identifying FGM types, enhance their awareness of FGM guidelines in clinical representation, and boost their self-confidence in performing reversal procedures like deinfibulation is crucial in order to ensure higher quality healthcare for women with FGM.

For instance, an educational intervention study that took place in Central Maine, United States, focused on increasing the obstetric care knowledge of 11 certified nurse-midwives as they deal with FGM female patients.[18] The intervention consisted of a PowerPoint presentation that informed the midwives about FGM and all four types of the practice, as well as discussions with members of notable medical clinic services and a hands-on lab that demonstrated the procedure of deinfibulation. The intervention's efficacy was evaluated with a before and after five-point Likert scale survey (with 1 implying low confidence and 5 implying full confidence) that mainly assessed the midwives' confidence in their knowledge of FGM types and clinical guidelines to follow when dealing with FGM patients. Fortunately, the results of this intervention found a promising increase in self-confidence amongst the midwives in regards to their ability to deliver effective obstetric care to women with FGM; identification of all four FGM types and management of each type amongst the midwives increased from 2.36 to 4.18 on the five-point Likert scale. The midwives' confidence in being able to advise women with the third type of FGM increased from 2.00 to 4.09.

[18]Julie Balfour et al., "Interventions for healthcare providers to improve treatment and prevention of female genital mutilation: a systematic review," BMC Health Services Research 16 (2016): 1-6, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-016-1674-1.

In reference to their confidence in performing deinfibulation, the midwives' scores rose from 1.54 to 3.54. Lastly, their ability to comprehend the historical, cultural, legal, and ethical considerations of FGM improved from 2.64 to 4.09.

Overall, this educational intervention, mainly based on a traditional presentation format that effectively informs medical practitioners of important FGM background information, has given a sign of hope that Western healthcare systems are becoming more equipped educationally to manage the FGM complications of female patients affected by this practice. In addition to this, there is also an advantage for this specific sample of US midwives to have discussions with members of well-known medical clinic services who have had a vast amount of experience interacting with various female patients with FGM complications, as these types of discussions help to set expectations for novice medical practitioners on what to expect when working with patients with FGM. This therefore allows them to become more prepared and confident in their future medical careers when it comes to handling FGM-related situations. Alongside this strategy is a hands-on lab about deinfibulation, which enables the US midwives, and medical professionals in general, to have the opportunity to apply the FGM knowledge that they obtained from the PowerPoint presentation as well as the discussions with medical clinics and use it as they attempt to handle female patients with FGM complications.

It is crucial to recognize that this specific intervention study was also able to help improve the expertise level of Western healthcare professionals related to the ethics of practicing FGM procedures. In an alternate reality, a truly broken healthcare system would mean that medical practitioners in the West, specifically those who are male, would come to a consensus that FGM is not a moral violation, in which case it wouldn't benefit FGM female patients because their health complications are guaranteed to be neglected and ignored by a pro-FGM healthcare system.

Nevertheless, this specific educational intervention proved the opposite of this, with the acknowledgement that FGM is a taboo practice by the US midwives being clear proof that while more work needs to be done to fill in the expertise gap, the US healthcare system, in particular, still remains committed to accelerating their attainment of knowledge on FGM and meeting the equitable needs of migrant women with FGM complications.

Another instance of an improvement in FGM expertise was examined in the educational training of 133 healthcare professionals in Liberia.[19] Following their training in sexual, obstetric, and psychological care for FGM women, these healthcare professionals were given before-and-after questionnaires that sought to analyze their acquired FGM knowledge from this training, their attitudes towards FGM, and their acceptability to apply WHO recommendations when managing female patients with FGM complications. The end result of the training intervention found an overall improvement in questionnaire test scores in areas such as collecting clinical history of FGM patients, performing genital examination, providing obstetric care, asking the correct questions to patients in order to identify FGM complications, and treating them correctly.[20] These Liberian healthcare professionals also regarded their ability to distinguish between different FGM types as improved, though this particular study did not mention to what extent the sample improved their ability to make these distinctions.

While this training intervention did not take place in a Western, high-income nation, it was important to mention the type of training being utilized by a non-Western healthcare system such as the one in Liberia because it could potentially act as a future framework that the Western

[19]Libretti et al., "Female genital mutilation."

[20]Ibid.

healthcare system can emulate as they seek to deliver more improved FGM care for migrant women. In fact, the training framework for which the Liberian study and the prior Maine study both followed were very similar; they both included training that informed medical practitioners of ways to identify and handle FGM complications and types, as well as a before-and-after survey that assessed them on whether or not their expertise on FGM has improved through this. Overall, with both of these study interventions proving to be successes in filling the FGM educational gap and enhancing healthcare for female patients who suffer from the practice's complications, the current Western healthcare system is one that is slowly improving over time.

Another type of educational training program, this time in the form of a self-directed e-book, aimed to examine whether the implementation of an FGM e-book helps to improve the knowledge, attitude, and self-confidence to carry out high-quality FGM healthcare of 86 undergraduate nursing students at a university located in Central New York.[21] The e-book itself contained three learning modules that covered the following: The first module covered the definition of FGM and its four classifications, the second module covered FGM health complications and clinical interventions that help to manage those complications, and the last module covered policies and ethical aspects that relate to FGM. In the end, the implementation of the FGM e-book was considered a success, as the results of the intervention did indicate a significant improvement in the nursing students' FGM knowledge, attitude, and self-confidence in delivering effective healthcare for women with FGM complications. Despite following a distinct format to the previous educational interventions mentioned prior, the success of a digital

[21]Najla A. Barnawi, "The effects of a digital educational intervention on undergraduate nursing students' attitudes, knowledge and self-efficacy with female genital cutting" (PhD diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2018), ProQuest (10747302).

educational intervention – divided into sections explaining the most important information any medical provider would need to know about FGM – in increasing FGM expertise amongst Western healthcare professionals is self-evident.

One of the main advantages of having the e-book as an FGM guide that is unlike a traditional PowerPoint presentation is that it is self-paced; the importance of a self-paced module is that it allows for medical practitioners to take their time learning new knowledge they've never been exposed to before about FGM. An educational method that enables future medical practitioners to learn about new knowledge at their own pace encourages patience for the female migrants with FGM complications, promising that over time, this system will eventually learn to compensate for the educational gap that currently hinders a healthcare provider's ability to assist their FGM patients.

Research Gaps To Address

While both a traditional, presentation-style and a self-paced, digital educational intervention have helped to expand the knowledge and increase the self-esteem of Western healthcare providers when caring for female patients with FGM complications, the literature did seem to present some noticeable gaps within the studies that limited the effectiveness of the interventions.

Overall, none of the studies mentioned anything about a follow-up with the healthcare providers' knowledge in FGM types and guidelines after a significant period of time following the post-surveys that assessed their immediate retention of FGM knowledge. By not ensuring a check-in on their acquired knowledge of FGM months or years after they took part in the educational training programs, it is more unlikely that healthcare providers, in the long run, will be able to

retain the information they initially learned about all four FGM identifications, its complications, and the clinical guidelines that direct them on managing the effects of FGM for migrant women.

Moreover, the studies also did not establish whether or not the female patients of the healthcare professionals perceived their care as adequate enough to manage their FGM complications. The lack of input from these female patients is concerning because it casts further doubt on the extent to which the acquired FGM knowledge of Western healthcare professionals from the educational interventions presented in the literature was actually enough to assist female patients in managing their FGM complications. In a Western-style democratic process, one that facilitates the principle of free speech, citizens are able to freely critique the institutions they find are failing to act in their best interest, which prompts for immediate institutional change in hopes for a better society. Due to this reason, it is imperative that Western societies attempt to implement this exact type of democratic process within their own healthcare systems, as it would empower female patients vulnerable to FGM with a voice to speak out against received medical attention they deem has not been sufficient enough in mitigating the impact of their health complications, and potentially accelerate the efforts in improving the West's approach to delivering FGM healthcare.

Transition to Proposed Policy Framework

This paper will now transition to introducing a policy framework that aims to enhance the way Western healthcare practitioners are retaining their knowledge about FGM in the long run, as well as install a democratic framework within the Western healthcare system that allows for the inclusion of FGM female patients, with their feedback acting as the determining factor in measuring the true extent of improvement within FGM medical care delivered in the West.

Recommended Policy Framework

The Comprehensive Awareness and Response Education Initiative for Female Genital Mutilation

Building upon the successes and attempting to address the gaps discovered in the previous case studies, a proposed program intervention, referred to as "The Comprehensive Awareness and Response Education (CARE) Initiative for Female Genital Mutilation" attempts to package some of the structural elements from the Maine study[22], the Liberian study[23], and the Central New York study[24] all in a three-month long, mandatory educational course. In a hypothetical world, this proposed educational initiative is set to be implemented within a sample size of 50 US gynecologists (doctors who specialize in the sexual and reproductive health of women) and obstetric healthcare providers at a local hospital in Columbus, Ohio.

To clarify the logistics of this course, the CARE Initiative would be offered at three different times during the calender year – typically 4-5 days a week in seasonal fashion during the fall, winter, and summer months – with each divided into three different curricular phases that, through one hour and 30 minute presentational-style lectures (akin to the PowerPoint presentational structure mentioned within the Maine study), would incorporate everything this sample of doctors would need to know about FGM. Assuming this course was held during the summer (e.g., June to August), the course would run as followed: For the first three weeks of the course from early June to nearly the end of June, Phase One would act as an introduction to the course by combining instruction about the official definition of FGM according to the WHO,

[22]Balfour et al., "Interventions for healthcare providers," 1-6.

[23]Libretti et al., "Female genital mutilation."

[24]Barnawi, "The effects of a digital educational intervention."

identification of all four types of FGM procedures, and the global prevalence of FGM in the contemporary world. Beginning in late June to mid-July, Phase Two would offer detailed instruction regarding the physical and mental complications that result from the practice of FGM. As for the remaining part of the course from mid-July to early-to-mid August, Phase Three would emphasize education about the clinical guidelines set in place by the WHO that explicate the ways doctors are better able to manage the complications of their FGM patients during clinical representation.

In addition to these lectures and in comparison to the intervention of the Maine study, the course would also have the doctors in this sample take part in a lab that allows for them to receive hands-on training experience in handling female patients with FGM; this training would aid these doctors in putting their ability to ask the correct questions to patients with FGM in real practice, which would allow them to quickly identify the different types of FGM complications their patients may be experiencing and help to treat those complications effectively. The training also prioritizes the steps a typical medical practitioner would take in helping to advise and treat the effects of FGM complications on their affected patients; this, for example, may involve the demonstration of deinfibulation to reverse the effects of infibulation.

Complementary to this presentational and interactive-type structure of the course is also an examination system that attempts to reinforce the content taught in all three phases. Inspired by the same type of questionnaires implemented within the Liberian study, this sample of doctors would partake in three exams, with the first two exams assessing content that is unique to Phases One and Two and the final exam being a cumulative assessment that tests content from all three phases. In order to be considered a successful graduate of this course, a medical professional must score at or above the 80% threshold for each of the first two exams, while the threshold requirement

for passing the final exam (which is weighted more than the first two exams of Phase One and Two in terms of content) is a 90% or above. This type of examination is designed to ensure that the participants of this course are, in the short term, sufficiently retaining information about FGM (its classifications, types of resulting complications, and the guidelines set to manage those complications) presented to them across a 3-month span.

As a supplement to the presentational-style lectures and the lab, the CARE Initiative would also incorporate an e-book option, similar to the one exemplified in the Central New York study, that allows for the sampled medical practitioners to asynchronously complete a series of modules correlated with the lecture information presented across the three phases of the course. While not mandatory to complete, the purpose of installing this additional e-book feature into the course is to provide a wider range of learning tools that may appeal to some of the doctors of the sample who believe they could capture the information of the in-person course at a much faster and efficient rate if they had this form of digital aid. To give an example of how this could potentially be accomplished in practice, following a lecture about the specific clinical guidelines recommended by the WHO associated with how medical practitioners should go about carrying out the procedure of deinfibulation, an e-book module that provides reading instruction and follow-up questions about the same information presented during that lecture would offer itself as an alternative way for the participants to establish further understanding about the guidelines related to deinfibulation.

In the year following successful graduation from the CARE Initiative course, a follow-up survey would be administered to the US doctors of the Ohio sample that would look to evaluate whether or not, after some period of time interacting with FGM patients during clinical representation in the long term, this course initiative was effective enough in assisting these doctors

in retaining valuable knowledge on FGM as well as self-confidence in identifying classification types of the practice and managing their patients' complications. Furthermore, to ensure that the CARE Initiative, unlike the interventions demonstrated in existing literature, is also democratically-constructed, there will be another survey given out to the female patients of whom were clinically represented by the sampled 50 US doctors from Columbus, Ohio, which would ask them to rate the performance of their healthcare provider in terms of delivering effective FGM care on a 1-10 scale (with 1 denoting ineffective FGM care, and 10 being very effective FGM care). This particular survey would allow for the voices of those female patients to be represented within the US healthcare system, and confirm whether or not the FGM care delivered by their practitioners was effective enough to help treat the risk of their FGM complications.

Conclusion

Female genital mutilation is defined as the practice of removing parts or all of the female genitalia for reasons that aren't medically justified. As the practice continues to be enforced in low-income countries across Africa and the Middle East, the global migration of women affected by FGM to Western societies has called on Western medical professionals to play a larger role in providing equitable and effective healthcare for migrant women vulnerable to the health complications of this practice. Overall, Western healthcare professionals have lacked significant knowledge of and confidence in identifying FGM classification types and complications. Experience-wise, the number of healthcare providers from the West who have had experience handling FGM patients in clinical representation has varied. Universally, Western healthcare providers hold a very negative perception of FGM.

Existing literature introduced three unique educational interventions that were implemented and analyzed within their own individual populations and settings, with all three finding success in increasing the FGM knowledge and confidence of Western healthcare professionals: A traditional, presentation-style format with a hands-on lab on defibulation and discussions with medical clinics that helped to inform 11 US midwives in Central Maine, a training program that assessed 133 Liberian healthcare providers in their sexual, obstetric, and psychological care of FGM women, and a self-paced e-book carried out in a sample of 86 undergraduate nursing students from Central New York. Despite the analysis of these interventions offering some promising results, more needs to be done in addressing the educational gap that continues to plague the Western healthcare system in its ability to effectively care for female patients who suffer constantly from their worsening FGM complications.

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Refugee Integration in the South Caucasus: Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh

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Abstract

Following a nine-month blockade and a 24-hour Azerbaijani offensive, nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh's 120,000 ethnic Armenians fled the territory. Most of these refugees sought shelter in Armenia, where they enjoy legal status and face little to no cultural barriers. However, past refugees in Armenia have nonetheless struggled to integrate. This paper assesses the current refugee crisis, drawing on the history of refugee integration in Armenia and case studies from neighboring Azerbaijan and Georgia. So far, Armenia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have largely addressed refugees' immediate needs. However, more is required to address long-term needs like securing steady employment, affordable housing, and access to education and healthcare. These barriers persist despite relative homogeneity with the host community, illuminating the South Caucasus as a critical case for refugee integration studies that counter traditional theories on the role of homogeneity in refugee integration. Effective resolution of persistent barriers in Armenia necessitates coordinated efforts with international NGOs, expanded volunteer outreach, and strategic diaspora engagement.

Keywords: Refugee Integration, post-Soviet Union conflict, South Caucasus, Armenia

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Introduction

Many refugee communities differ from their hosts in ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. These cases are predominant in studies of refugee integration, and cultural differences are often cited as a main barrier to integration. However, the post-Soviet Union sphere's "frozen conflicts" present cases of relative homogeneity with host communities. As cultural divergences are largely absent and refugees have legal status, a more accurate assessment of the impact of social differences on refugee integration is possible. The example of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees in Armenia, with comparative analysis from similar cases in Azerbaijan and Georgia, serves as an excellent case study. Though the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute has deep historical roots, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict today dominates relations. The largest waves of refugees were displaced during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the early 1990s. A second wave followed the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. The third wave followed the capitulation of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh in September 2023, following which the remaining ethnic Armenians fled through the Lachin Corridor, with 115,000 registered as refugees in Armenia as of March 2024.[1]

This paper evaluates the integration of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees following the September 2023 Azerbaijani offensive. In Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh refugees share the majority ethnicity, practice the same religion, and speak the same language, albeit a different dialect. Yet, as seen in similar cases in Georgia and Azerbaijan, refugees still face significant barriers to integration. This brings into question common assumptions about the role of

[1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Armenia Emergency Six-Month Impact Report: September 2023 – March 2024, (New York: UNHCR, 2024), 4.

homogeneity in refugee integration, finding that even in "ideal" conditions, refugees face worse long-run outcomes.

Literature Review

As defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is a person who has a "fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".[2] While this definition provides a general guide, it is not all-encompassing. Some have argued that the UNHCR definition is not just inadequate, but actively impairs analysis of refugee crises;[3] this definition omits refugees in cases where borders are disputed. In the South Caucasus, whether an individual is "outside the country of his nationality" often depends on a given party's stance on the conflict. For example, a displaced individual from Abkhazia living in Tbilisi would be considered a refugee by Venezuela, but an internally displaced person by France. Therefore, this paper considers any individual forced to cross a national border, as recognized by any party in a conflict to be "outside the country of his nationality".

Refugee integration, as defined by Michaela Hynie, refers to the "inclusion and participation, both economically and socially".[4] The UNHCR further notes that "the process of

[2] "Refugee Definition," March 1, 2019, https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/legal-framework/refugee-definition.

[3] Heaven Crawley and Dimitris Skleparis, "Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding in Europe's 'Migration Crisis,'" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no. 1 (2018): 48–64; Roger Zetter, "More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization," Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no. 2 (2007): 172–92.; Andrew E. Shacknove, "Who Is a Refugee?" Ethics 95, no. 2 (1985): 274–84.

[4] Michaela Hynie, "Refugee Integration: Research and Policy," Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 24, no. 3 (2018): 265–76.

integration is complex and gradual, comprising distinct but interrelated legal, economic, and social and cultural dimensions, all of which are important for refugees' ability to integrate successfully as fully included members of the host society".[5] This broad definition encapsulates an incredibly complex process that differs greatly depending on the conditions present in both the refugee and host communities.[6] Actions from international institutions, states, and civil society organizations are key to the integration process. However, the success of integration depends on government policies, attitudes towards forced migrants, and the domestic economic and political conditions.[7] Integration outcomes also vary by gender,[8] as well as socioeconomic status.[9]

Alister Ager and Alison Strang divide refugee integration into a four-tiered pyramid: foundations (rights and citizenship), facilitators (language, cultural knowledge, safety, and stability), social connection (social bridges, bonds, and links), and markers (employment, housing, education, and healthcare).[10] Major barriers to integration include language differences, religious disparities, and limited personal connections with host communities, alongside perceptions of refugees as violent, fears of cultural disruption, economic competition concerns, and media portrayals that infantilize refugees.[11] Given the absence of many barriers, these theories indicate

[5] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The Integration of Refugees: A Discussion Paper (Cyprus: UNHCR, 2014).

[6] Hynie, "Refugee Integration," 267.

[7] Jenny Phillimore, "Refugee-Integration-Opportunity Structures: Shifting the Focus from Refugees to Context," Journal of Refugee Studies 34, no. 2 (2020): 1946–66.

[8] Sin Yi Cheung and Jenny Phillimore, "Gender and Refugee Integration: A Quantitative Analysis of Integration and Social Policy Outcomes," Journal of Social Policy 46, no. 2 (2017): 211–30.

[9] Doğuş Şimşek, "Integration Processes of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: 'Class-Based Integration,'" Journal of Refugee Studies 33, no. 3 (2020): 537–54.

[10] Alister Ager and Alison Strang, "Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework," Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 2 (2008): 166–91.

[11] Hynie, "Refugee Integration," 267.

that Nagorno-Karabakh refugees should face relatively little struggle in integration. Nonetheless, despite relative ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural homogeneity with broader Armenian society, past waves of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees have consistently faced major integration barriers.

In contrast, the theory of Cumulative Advantage, and its inverse Cumulative Disadvantage, posit that those who get ahead will stay ahead, and those who fall behind will stay behind.[12] Cumulative Disadvantage has previously been used to explain worse long-term outcomes for forced migrants.[13] The theory's focus on feedback mechanisms and path dependency helps explain why refugees in the South Caucasus, particularly those who are relatively homogenous to their host communities, have significantly worse long-term outcomes despite intervention from both state and non-state actors. It implies that having refugee status, even when conditions are otherwise "ideal," results in worse long-term outcomes.

There are three primary routes for refugee integration: voluntary repatriation to their country of origin, local integration in their country of first refuge, and third country resettlement. Much of the integration literature focuses on third country resettlement, typically in Western Europe or North America. However, it has been argued that local integration in the country of first refuge is an underutilized but viable alternative to both voluntary repatriation and third country

[12] Robert K. Merton, "The Matthew Effect in Science," Science 159 (1968): 56–63; Robert K. Merton, "The Matthew Effect in Science, II: Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property," Isis 79, no. 4 (1988): 606–23.

[13] Divya Mishra, Paul B. Spiegel, Vasileia Lucero Digidiki, and Peter J. Winch, "Interpretation of Vulnerability and Cumulative Disadvantage Among Unaccompanied Adolescent Migrants in Greece: A Qualitative Study," PLoS Medicine 17, no. 3 (2020): e1003087.

resettlement.[14] However, the literature on local integration largely neglects refugee crises in the South Caucasus, instead focusing on cases in Africa,[15] Latin America,[16] and the Middle East.[17]

Among the limited number of researchers who have studied the region, Artjoms Ivlevs and Michail Veliziotis examined the long-term labor market integration of internally displaced people (IDPs) and cross-border refugees in nine post-socialist countries, including Armenia and Azerbaijan.[18] They argue that displaced people are significantly worse off 10-15 years after conflict due to a loss of assets, psychological trauma, uncertainty about the future, negative reception by host communities, institutional barriers, and loss of educational opportunity.[19] In each case examined, there are relatively few ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences, which provides further evidence for the role of Cumulative Disadvantage in refugee integration. However, these integration challenges cannot be divorced from the broader historical context of the Soviet Union's collapse and its aftermath in the South Caucasus.

The conflicts that erupted following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have deep historical roots. Soviet Union Nationality Policy granted varying levels of autonomy to the ethnic

[14] Jeff Crisp, The Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual and Historical Analysis (UNHCR, April 2004).

[15] Lahra Smith, Douglas A. Howard, Mark Giordano, Nili Sarit Yossinger, Lara Kinne, and Susan F. Martin, "Local Integration and Shared Resource Management in Protracted Refugee Camps: Findings from a Study in the Horn of Africa," Journal of Refugee Studies 34, no. 1 (2021): 787–805.

[16] Fabio Varoli, "Cities of Solidarity: Local Integration in Latin America," Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 44–46.

[17] Allison Spencer Hartnett, "The Effect of Refugee Integration on Migrant Labor in Jordan," Review of Middle East Studies 52, no. 2 (2018): 263–82.

[18] Artjem Ivlevs and Michail Veliziotis, "Beyond Conflict: Long-Term Labour Market Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in Post-Socialist Countries," Journal of Vocational Behavior 105 (2018): 131–46.

[19] Ibid.

republics, largely suppressing conflict.[20] When a 1980s Soviet Union policy called Glasnost increased openness and transparency and allowed for greater freedom of speech, it unintentionally revived ethnic conflicts that had not disappeared, but were simply in hibernation.[21] Though these disputes began as nationalist movements for greater autonomy, by the 1990s they had spiraled out of control in the post-Soviet Union power vacuum.[22] These conflicts have persisted for decades after the dissolution of the USSR, killing at least 130,000 people and displacing millions more.[23] The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most destructive conflict in the South Caucasus, having displaced hundreds of thousands of people in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Though the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict garnered global attention during the Soviet Union's collapse, it is rooted in a centuries-long dispute that was further exacerbated by the nation-building process. Like other post-Soviet Union conflicts, the point of contention is a historical "right" to a particular territory based on ethnic, religious, or linguistic arguments. In this case, all three are at play. According to Anatoly Yamskov, it resulted from inherent religious and cultural differences in conjunction with territorial, legal, political, and ideological preconditions, as well as national-cultural, socioeconomic, and ethno-demographic direct causes.[24] Historical arguments are a key aspect of both claims: Azerbaijanis argue that they are Turkisized Caucasian Albanians,

[20] Petr F. Dostál and Hans Knippenberg, "Russification of Soviet Nationalities: The Importance of Territorial Autonomy," History of European Ideas 15, no. 4–6 (1992): 631–38.

[21] P. L. Dash, "Nationalities Problem in USSR: Discord over Nagorno-Karabakh," Economic and Political Weekly 24, no. 2 (1989): 72–74.

[22] Dov Lynch, "Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts," International Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002): 831–48.

[23] Robert E. Hamilton, "The Post-Soviet Wars: Part I," Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 18, 2017.

[24] Anatoly Yamskov, "Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh," Theory and Society 20, no. 5 (1991): 631–60.

indigenous to the territory contrasted, while Armenians claim ownership based on historical records dating back to 370 CE.[25]

For much of recorded history, the South Caucasus was under the control of a single entity. Major empires including the Timurid, Safavid, Qajar Persia, and Russian Empire all ruled the region at various points, including Nagorno-Karabakh. During these periods, centralized administration largely prevented full-scale ethnic conflict. However, the devolution of power to independent Armenian and Azerbaijani states following the collapse of the Russian Empire left a power vacuum leading to the modern territorial dispute.

The short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR), founded during the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917, failed to stabilize the region. Amidst the collapse of the TDFR in May 1918, war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territories of Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. By the end of 1920, the Soviet Union conquest of the South Caucasus brought the region back under Moscow's control. However, the new administration failed to address the underlying issues, only temporarily suppressing conflict. The majority of Zangezur was incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, while Nakhichevan was incorporated into the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. Despite a majority Armenian population, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was incorporated into the greater Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. This was not an accident; it enabled Moscow to

[25] Levon Avdoyan, "Nagorno Karabakh: An Historical Perspective," International Journal on Group Rights 3, no. 2 (1995): 161–67.

maintain political control over the South Caucasus by ensuring the necessity of the Kremlin as a mediator.[26]

Prior to the 1980s, various Armenian groups unsuccessfully petitioned the Kremlin for Nagorno-Karabakh's annexation into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.[27] Yet following Glasnost-era reforms, the Armenian Academy of Sciences formally requested a transfer of the NKAO and Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (NASSR) to Armenia in 1987.[28] During the implosion of the USSR and the weakening of centralized power, the Gorbachev administration's inconsistent stance on the issue failed to stabilize the situation.[29] By the end of 1991, the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, supported by Armenia, declared independence from Azerbaijan leading to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.

In the conflict that ensued, Armenia captured not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but seven surrounding Azerbaijani administrative districts, making Nagorno-Karabakh contiguous to Armenia, before a Russian-brokered ceasefire brought an end to the fighting in May 1994.[30] This territory was then administered by the Republic of Artsakh but remained unrecognized by any United Nations member states, even while Armenia subsequently pushed for its recognition based

[26] Paul A. Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 16, no. 2 (1992): 18–26.

[27] Ali Askerov, "The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict," in Post-Soviet Conflicts: The Thirty Years' Crisis (Lexington Books, 2020), 55.

[28] Ibid, 57.

[29] Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis."

[30] Vincenc Kopeck, Tomas Hoch, and Vladimir Baar, "Conflict Transformation and Civil Society: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh," Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 3 (2016): 441–59.

on the right to self-determination, with an eventual goal of voluntary annexation.[31] However, these efforts were unsuccessful, and other than a brief outburst in 2016, the conflict remained frozen for nearly three decades.

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in September 2020. Aided by a well-financed military, Azerbaijan successfully reclaimed the administrative districts occupied by Armenia since 1994, as well as small chunks of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.[32] World leaders called for a cessation of hostilities, and the conflict ended with a Russian-negotiated ceasefire on November 10th, 2020.[33] In a reversal of the balance from the early 1990s, it became clear that Armenia was no longer able to counter growing Azerbaijani military power without significant foreign intervention. In December 2022, Azerbaijan began a blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the narrow strip connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.[34] Then, in a 24-hour military assault beginning on September 20, 2023, the Azerbaijani military overran Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the unconditional surrender of the Republic of Artsakh.[35] Over the following week, almost the

[31] Milena Sterio, "Self-Determination and Secession under International Law: Nagorno-Karabakh," German Yearbook of International Law 59 (2016): 81–114.

[32] Valeri Modebadze, "The Escalation of Conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and the Problems of Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh War," Journal of Liberty and International Affairs 6, no. 3 (2021): 102–10.

[33] "Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Azerbaijan, Armenia Agree Ceasefire," BBC News, November 12, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54324772.

[34] Kirill Krivosheev, "What the Dissolution of Nagorno-Karabakh Means for the South Caucasus," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 29, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/09/what-the-dissolution-of-nagorno-karabakh-means-for-the-south-caucasus?lang=en.

[35] Ibid.

entirety of Nagorno-Karabakh's ethnic Armenian population, estimated at over 120,000 people, fled to Armenia.[36]

Armenia Today

Armenia today is a country in transition. Previously ruled by an authoritarian regime, the "Velvet Revolution" in 2018 resulted in the first free and fair elections in the country's history.[37] However, in contrast to the "Rose Revolution" in neighboring Georgia, Armenia did not reorient its foreign policy stance away from Russia, instead choosing to continue honoring its political and military commitments to the Kremlin.[38] The disastrous Second Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in a rift between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the top military leadership.[39] Yet Moscow's failure to intervene in the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive instead turned blame towards Russia.[40] Armenia subsequently announced plans to leave the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty

[36] David Scheffer, "Ethnic Cleansing Is Happening in Nagorno-Karabakh. How Can the World Respond?" Council on Foreign Relations, October 4, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/ethnic-cleansing-happening-nagorno-karabakh-how-can-world-respond.

[37] Olesya Vartanyan, "'Velvet Revolution' Takes Armenia into the Unknown," Crisis Group, April 26, 2018, https://lobelog.com/velvet-revolution-takes-armenia-into-the-unknown/.

[38] Miriam Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, "Armenia's Velvet Revolution," Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (2019): 85–99.

[39] Celestine Bohlen, "Armenia's Postwar Crisis: What to Know," Council on Foreign Relations, March 25, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/armenias-postwar-crisis-what-know.

[40] Alexander Atasuntsev, "Long-Standing Ties between Armenia and Russia Are Fraying Fast," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/10/long-standing-ties-between-armenia-and-russia-are-fraying-fast?lang=en.

Organization,[41] and indicated that it would seek European Union membership.[42] By June 2024, all Russian peacekeeping forces had withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh.[43]

Despite domestic turmoil, Freedom House noted significant improvement in political freedom, granting Armenia a score of 54/100, or "partly free."[44] Furthermore, Armenia's economic reforms have been relatively successful, with high growth rates and ascension as an International Development Association donor only nine years after being a recipient.[45] Though growth has slowed from a high of 12.6% in 2022, projected rates for the next few years hover around 6%, one of the highest in the post-Soviet Union sphere.[46] The unemployment rate in 2023 fell to 13%, after hovering around 20% for the previous decade.[47] With a Government Debt to GDP ratio of roughly 50%, stable trade balance, and manageable inflation, Armenia maintains a strong economic outlook.[48]

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[41] Avet Demourian, "Armenian Leader Announces Plan to Leave Russia-Dominated Security Alliance as Ties with Moscow Sour," AP News, June 12, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/armenia-russia-csto-security-alliance-2968d29f8fe97a1be8d1a952a1d2ebb8.

[42] "Armenia Is Considering Seeking EU Membership, Foreign Minister Says," Reuters, March 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenia-is-considering-seeking-eu-membership-foreign-minister-says-2024-03-09/.

[43] "Russian Peacekeepers Complete Withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh," The Moscow Times, June 12, 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/12/russian-peacekeepers-complete-withdrawal-from-nagorno-karabakh-a85385.

[44] "Armenia: Freedom in the World 2023," Freedom House, accessed April 14, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/armenia/freedom-world/2023.

[45] "Armenia Overview," World Bank, accessed June 20, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/armenia/overview.

[46] "Armenia: Economy," Asian Development Bank, accessed June 20, 2024, https://www.adb.org/where-we-work/armenia/economy.

[47] International Monetary Fund, "Armenia," International Monetary Fund, accessed April 21, 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/ARM.

[48] Ibid.

Yet despite economic progress, Armenia has experienced significant population decline since independence, from 3,617,631 in 1991 to 2,780,469 in 2022, a result of low birth rates and persistent negative net migration largely to Russia and the West.[49] A significant "brain drain" of educated professionals occurred due to ongoing conflict, bleak economic opportunities, and a thriving Armenian diaspora.[50] However, the diaspora has benefited Armenia at times through extensive lobbying in the United States.[51] Since the mid-20th century, significant repatriation efforts have attempted to draw its diaspora back to Armenia.[52] However, these efforts have failed to reverse Armenia's population decline.

Refugee Integration in Armenia

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Other refugees have also remained displaced in Armenia, including ethnic Armenians fleeing the Syrian Civil War, and more recently, Russians avoiding draft notices. While these refugees face fewer barriers than in many cases around the world, they have still struggled to integrate. As of mid-2024, there are 143,905 UNHCR-registered refugees in Armenia.[53] However, the current refugee crisis reflects a legacy of ethnic displacement dating back to the later years of the Soviet Union.

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[49] World Bank, "Armenia Overview."

[50] Tatevik Vardanyan, "Comprehensive Analysis of the Migration Situation in Armenia," Messenger of Armenian State University of Economics 6 (2021): 150–60, https://doi.org/10.52174/1829-0280_2021_6_150.

[51] Julien Zarifian, "The Armenian-American Lobby and Its Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy," Soc 51 (2014): 503–12.

[52] Haykanush Chobanyan, "Return Migration and Reintegration Issues: Armenia," European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2013, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27863/CARIM-East_RR-2013-03.pdf?sequence=1.

[53] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Operational Report: Armenia (Armenia: UNHCR, September 2024).

Escalating ethnic tensions in the late 1980s caused around 250,000 ethnic Azeris and 235,000 ethnic Armenians to flee their homes.[54] Following the conclusion of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the influx of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees into Armenia ceased for two decades. An unknown number of ethnic Armenians from the diaspora were repatriated during this period.[55] Additionally, at least 20,000 ethnic Armenians fled to Armenia during the Syrian Civil War.[56] Despite Armenia's welcoming attitude, new arrivals have struggled to find steady employment, affordable housing, and access to healthcare and education.[57] In the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, at least 91,000 more ethnic Armenians were displaced, 88% of whom were women, children, and the elderly.[58] Additionally, fearing conscription notices, the Russia-Ukraine War prompted hundreds of thousands of Russians to flee, many choosing Armenia due to its visa-free access for 180 days. Though exact figures are unknown, some have estimated as many as 100,000 Russians have arrived in Armenia since February 2022.[59]

These distinct groups of arrivals have vastly diverse backgrounds and face different challenges when integrating into Armenian society. Repatriates are often highly skilled and possess more financial resources. However, they have struggled with social isolation, cultural

[54] International Crisis Group, "Tackling Azerbaijan's IDP Burden," Europe Briefing No. 67, February 27, 2012.

[55] Policy Forum Armenia, "Armenia-Diaspora Relations: 20 Years since Independence" (2010).

[56] UNICEF, Assessment of the Situation of Asylum-Seeking, Refugee and Displaced Children in Armenia, 2013, https://www.unicef.org/armenia/en/reports/assessment-situation-asylum-seeking-refugee-and-displaced-children-armenia.

[57] Rebecca L. Thomas, Grace Felten, Lisa Yagaloff, and Marine Yarmaloyan, "Returning Home: The Experiences of Resettlement for Syrian-Armenian Refugees into Armenia," Journal of International Migration and Integration 21 (2020): 469–84.

[58] UNHCR, Operational Report: Armenia.

[59] Daniel Ofman, "In Yerevan, Armenia, a School Serving Exiled Russians Helps Families Put Down Roots," The World, September 3, 2024, https://theworld.org/stories/2024/09/03/in-yerevan-armenia-a-school-serving-exiled-russians-helps-families-put-down-roots.

differences, language barriers, economic challenges, and the broader psychological impacts of repatriation,[60] as well as some legal barriers.[61] In contrast, the challenges facing refugees, both from Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria, largely consist of meeting basic needs. Additionally, although most Nagorno-Karabakh refugees speak Armenian, their distinctive accent sets them apart. UNHCR officials found that refugees in Armenia face significant challenges in access to adequate housing, healthcare, education, and employment opportunities.[62] A study from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War indicates that these refugees have faced similar barriers in urban areas, such as finding employment, affordable housing, and access to education and healthcare, particularly in Yerevan.[63] Russian emigres are a newer phenomenon. Many hope to return to Russia if domestic conditions improve, but in the meantime have adapted to living in exile, forming tight-knit communities and setting up Russian-language schools.[64] These emigres are often skilled professionals, bringing a much-needed boost to the growing Armenian IT sector, but their arrival has also increased the overall cost of living and caused a housing crisis, particularly in Yerevan.[65]

[60] Gagik Tumanyan and Tatevik Karapetyan, "Identifying Integration Barriers for Repatriated Young People in Armenia," Journal of Sociology: Bulletin of Yerevan University 14, no. 2 (2023): 28–44.

[61] Petros Aghababyan, "Integration of Aliens and Reintegration of Returnees in the Republic of Armenia: Legal Aspects," CARIM East - Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, 2013.

[62] George Groenewold and Jeannette Schoorl, Millennium Development Indicators and Coping Behaviour: Living Conditions of Refugees in Armenia (UNHCR, 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/media/millennium-development-indicators-and-coping-behaviour-living-conditions-refugees-armenia.

[63] Harutyun Vermishyan, Hayk Smbatyan, Mariam Arakelyan, Julya Sahakyan, and Armine Bagiyan, Urban Integration Experiences of the Displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, policy brief (Raoul Wallenberg Institute, 2023).

[64] Ofman, "In Yerevan, Armenia, a School Serving Exiled Russians."

[65] Benyamin Poghosyan, "How Russian Migration Fuels Armenia's IT Sector Growth," Italian Institute for International Political Studies, November 6, 2023, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/how-russian-migration-fuels-armenias-it-sector-growth-151311.

While their sustained presence is uncertain, it is nonetheless a significant factor to consider for the Armenian government.

The Current Refugee Crisis

Armenia's current refugee crisis is less acute than previous waves, but still threatens an unsustainable strain on government resources. By March 2024, 115,000 Nagorno-Karabakh refugees had registered with the UNHCR.[66] These arrivals make up roughly 4.1% of Armenia's total population, comparable to larger countries with significant refugee populations like Iran (~3.7%), Turkey (~4.3%), and Germany (~3.4%).[67] Most refugees arrived without belongings and sought shelter in crowded environments such as hotels, hostels, schools, or with family and friends.[68]

The UNHCR and its partners requested $97 million for the "Armenia Refugee Response Plan," with 51% of requested aid being secured as of March 2024.[69] The UNHCR and its partner, Mission Armenia, have distributed 115,747 "core relief items" to 51,221 people, including bedding, household items, warm clothing, hygiene kits, and towels.[70] In October 2023, the Armenian Government initiated a "temporary protected status," consisting of a 100,000 Armenian dram ($250) payout along with 50,000 Armenain dram ($125) in monthly stipend for all displaced

[66] UNHCR, Armenia Emergency Report.

[67] Author's calculations from World Bank, "Armenia Overview,"; UNHCR, Refugee Population Statistics Database (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023).

[68] UNHCR, Armenia Emergency Report.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

persons, including children.[71] Though most Karabakh Armenians already held Armenian passports, the government also extended full citizenship to all registered refugees, giving them the choice between citizenship and "temporary protected status."[72] Thus far, Armenia has avoided refugee camps, with all displaced people hosted in private homes, hotels, schools, or other permanent shelters.[73] According to Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Khachatrian, 16,300 refugees had official jobs as of April 2024, with more than a thousand registered as individual entrepreneurs or business owners, up from 5,350 in December 2023.[74]

Yet despite these steps, there remain serious barriers to integration. Of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees, 31% are children, 14% are elderly, and many are disabled or have chronic health conditions.[75] Thus, a high percentage of refugees are unable to contribute to the labor force while requiring immediate medical attention. Most refugees have flocked to Yerevan, but the city is already facing a housing crisis, in part due to the influx of Russian emigres.[76] The psychological and social needs of the community also remain an ongoing issue. While many Armenian refugees have expressed that their host communities have been welcoming,[77] others have reported feeling lost and hopeless while settling into their new lives, largely attributed to the loss of connection to

[71] Republic of Armenia, "Compatriots of Nagorno Karabakh Should Have a Temporary Protection Certificate along with Their Passport When Traveling," January 26, 2024, https://www.gov.am/en/news/item/10474/.

[72] Lilit Shahverdyan, "Armenia to Offer Refugee Status to Displaced Karabakhis," EurasiaNet, October 30, 2023, https://eurasianet.org/armenia-to-offer-refugee-status-to-displaced-karabakhis.

[73] Olesya Vartanyan, "Armenia Struggles to Cope with Exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh," Crisis Group, March 4, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict-armenia/armenia-struggles-cope-exodus.

[74] Government Releases New Jobs Data On Karabakh Refugees," Azatutyun, June 20, 2024, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33002781.html.

[75] UNHCR, Armenia Emergency Report.

[76] Vartanyan, "Armenia Struggles to Cope with Exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh."

[77] UNHCR, Armenia Emergency Report.

their homelands.[78] Therefore, the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh refugees will likely face the same integration barriers as previous groups: finding steady employment, affordable housing, and access to healthcare and education. However, the struggle to integrate is by no means restricted to Armenia, and neighboring countries have largely faced the same difficulties with their own refugee populations.

The Broader South Caucasus

Barriers to refugee integration are prevalent throughout the South Caucasus. Like Armenia, refugees in Azerbaijan and Georgia face challenges in securing refugees access to employment, housing, education, and healthcare, despite relative homogeneity with their host communities. The region's history of post-Soviet Union protracted conflicts continues to shape refugee policy and outcomes. Comparative analysis across the South Caucasus illuminates the roots of these challenges and provides insight into the success of varied approaches to overcoming integration barriers.

Azerbaijan

Most refugees in Azerbaijan were displaced during the early years of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In addition, to the 250,000 displaced during the 1980s, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War displaced 600,000 more Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven surrounding districts.[79] At least 43,000 Meskhetian Turks also arrived during this period after facing

[78] "In Armenia, Exiles from Nagorno-Karabakh Navigate a New Life of Reduced Opportunities," La Croix International, October 15, 2024, https://international.la-croix.com/news/world/in-armenia-exiles-from-nagorno-karabakh-navigate-a-new-life-of-reduced-opportunities/19137.

[79] International Crisis Group, "Tackling Azerbaijan's IDP Burden."

persecution in Uzbekistan.[80] In the early years, refugees lacked housing, education, and healthcare, and were constrained to the informal sector, with some resorting to so-called "slave markets" out of desperation.[81] In 1998, Azerbaijan passed legislation offering full citizenship to refugees displaced from 1988-1992 and their children, including those displaced in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Fueled by rising oil profits and a fear of political upheaval, the Azerbaijani government reportedly spent over 3% of its GDP on resources for refugees, mostly in housing, healthcare, and education.[82]

Yet like in Armenia, refugees face barriers to integration despite major legislation and significant government expenditure. A 2012 report found that nearly 400,000 IDPs still lacked adequate housing,[83] and many have difficulty finding employment.[84] Moreover, even 30 years after the conflict, many Azeris still long to return to their ancestral homes.[85] The struggle for refugees in Azerbaijan to find the stability and structure required to rebuild their lives parallels that of Armenia. Despite significant government expenditure, refugee communities have remained marginalized, with their disadvantages compounding over time. This has had a broader negative

[80] Denika Blacklock, "Finding Durable Solutions for the Meskhetians," European Centre for Minority Issues, June 6, 2005.

[81] Arif Yunusov, "Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and IDPs in Azerbaijan: Issues and Perspectives," Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, 2012.

[82] International Crisis Group, "Tackling Azerbaijan's IDP Burden."

[83] Ibid.

[84] Mehrangiz Najafizadeh, "Ethnic Conflict and Forced Displacement: Narratives of Azeri IDP and Refugee Women From the Nagorno-Karabakh War," Journal of International Women's Studies 14, no. 1 (2013): 161–83.

[85] "Azeri refugees long to return to Nagorno-Karabakh," France 24, September 25, 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230925-azeri-refugees-long-to-return-to-nagorno-karabakh.

impact on the economic stability of Azerbaijan, with refugees remaining reliant on costly government programs.

Georgia

Similar to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia faced an influx of refugees in the early 1990s due to two territorial disputes: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During the late 1980s, the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a multiethnic region under Georgian administration, appealed to the Kremlin to be reinstated as a Soviet Socialist Republic in response to rising Georgian nationalism and its clear intentions of leaving the USSR.[86] In response, the Georgian government stripped the region of its autonomy in 1990. [87] Abkhazia then declared independence amidst the chaos of the Georgian Civil War (1991-1993), leading to bloody conflict. The ill-prepared Georgian troops were unable to recapture the territory, and a Russian-brokered ceasefire brought an end to active combat in 1994. According to Catherine Dale, all involved parties committed ethnic cleansing.[88] During the conflict, roughly 240,000 people were displaced, most of whom were ethnic Georgians.[89]

To the east of Abkhazia, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast unsuccessfully petitioned Tbilisi for increased autonomy while holding their own elections in 1990, before declaring

[86] Alexander Krylov, "The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict," in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford University Press, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2001), 281–94.

[87] Liana Kvarchelia, "Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict: View from Abkhazia," Demokratizatsiya 6, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 1–10, https://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/06-1_kvarchelia.pdf.

[88] Catherine Dale, "The Dynamics and Challenges of Ethnic Cleansing: The Georgia-Abkhazia Case," Refugee Survey Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1997): 77–109.

[89] Erin Mooney, From Solidarity to Solutions: The Government Response to Internal Displacement in Georgia. Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, 2011.

independence after its special status was revoked by the Georgian government.[90] Following two years of intense fighting, the two sides signed a Russian-brokered ceasefire in 1992.[91] Around 60,000 people were displaced in the conflict, with 20,000 ethnic Georgians forced to flee South Ossetia.[92] Following the escalation of tensions in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, forcing a surrender in just five days. Russia then granted Abkhazia and South Ossetia official recognition, ensuring the territories' continued autonomy.[93] As of 2014, there remained 253,392 displaced persons within Georgia.[94]

The refugees from these conflicts have "remained marginalized, vulnerable and poor relative to the rest of the Georgian population."[95] Though the UNHCR report slightly disagrees, stating "as time passes, the non-shelter related needs of internally displaced persons are increasingly similar to or the same as those of the poorer segments of the population not directly affected by displacement," it nonetheless acknowledges that displaced people face challenges in access to housing, education, healthcare, and economic opportunities.[96] Ten years later, the situation appears to be unchanged, as these communities have seen only modest improvement in

[90] M. Konig, "The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict," in OSCE Yearbook 2004, ed. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) (Baden-Baden, 2005), 237–49.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Mooney, From Solidarity to Solutions.

[93] Peter Dickinson, "The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin's Green Light," Atlantic Council, August 7, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org.

[94] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Status of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Georgia, 2014.

[95] Lela Rekhviashvili, "Survival Strategies of the Poor and Marginalised — The Case of Internally Displaced People in Georgia," SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 15, no. 1 (2012): 123–35.

[96] UNHCR, Status of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia.

income and living conditions, even as the rest of the country has experienced economic growth.[97] Like in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the presence of economically and socially disadvantaged refugee communities has plagued successive Georgian governments.

Policy Options

Comprehensive policy approaches in collaboration with non-governmental organizations and local communities are needed to ensure that the integration of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees is successful. Though granting refugees the option for full citizenship or refugee benefits is beneficial, the sheer number of displaced people strains government resources. Providing essential services is the most immediate need, but these programs have an exceedingly high cost over time. In Azerbaijan, this gap was partially filled by high government expenditures funded by oil revenues, while in Georgia, it remains largely unaddressed. To best facilitate integration, Armenia should adopt a three-pronged approach: securing aid from major international NGOs, promoting refugee employment through specialized organizations and volunteer initiatives, and strengthening engagement with the diaspora.

Seeking aid from international NGOs is crucial for Armenia to meet the immediate needs of refugees without taking on unsustainable debt. The UNHCR has been critical in providing immediate support, but other international human rights organizations like the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Doctors Without Borders, and Oxfam International, faith-based organizations like World Vision and Catholic Relief Services, and local organizations like Armenian Caritas and the Armenian Red Cross have also provided aid. However, addressing the long-term needs of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees requires a multifaceted approach that remains

[97] Giorgi Lomsadze, "Georgia's Displaced People: A Life in Limbo," EurasiaNet, February 3, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/georgias-displaced-people-a-life-in-limbo.

cognizant of international NGOs' limited resources, especially amidst crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

While major international organizations like the UNHCR have extensive capabilities to rapidly mobilize aid, engaging with smaller, more specialized NGOs like the Refugee Commission and Tearfund can be an effective long-term strategy for countries dealing with refugee crises. Armenia should work closely with these organizations to develop tailored strategies to meet refugees' long-term needs. Securing steady employment can have a multiplicative effect on reducing other integration barriers, as it provides financial resources, creates transferable skills, and deepens refugees' connections to their host communities. Armenia could also offer tax incentives to businesses to employ refugees in industries where they have previous experience, while offering vocational training programs to advance new skills. Additionally, Armenia should initiate volunteer outreach programs aimed at assisting refugees with navigating persistent logistical challenges. This would serve to help meet refugees' needs, but also facilitate broader integration through creating connections within their host communities. International NGO engagement and domestic strategies are key to facilitating Nagorno-Karabakh refugees' integration, yet Armenia also has a unique resource not present in Georgia or Azerbaijan that has so far been underutilized.

The Armenian diaspora, particularly in the United States, has extensive multinational networks, significant financial resources, and is generally sympathetic to the struggles of Armenian refugees. Armenian organizations in the United States are already aware of the current refugee crisis and have effectively lobbied for action at the federal level. The United States and the European Union have already committed tens of millions of dollars to supporting Armenia's development. Samantha Power, the US Agency for International Development administrator,

announced an additional $11.9 million in aid on a July 2024 trip to Armenia.[98] The Joint Statement on US-Armenia Strategic Dialogue Capstone in June 2024 specifically stated that "the United States acknowledges the ongoing economic and social challenges Armenia faces in supporting displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and intends to continue to assist the Government of Armenia's efforts in this regard."[99] In the same month, Representative Adam Schiff, joined by 47 representatives, authored a letter urging Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to ensure that "all U.S. Diplomats prioritize this issue by raising the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage at every meeting with officials at all levels of the government of Azerbaijan."[100] These official statements and high-level engagement spread awareness while providing broad support to Armenia, yet more direct engagement with the diaspora is lacking.

Armenia should pursue a dual approach to the diaspora, raising awareness through social media campaigns while seeking individual, big-ticket donors. Armenia could connect with local networks through social media campaigns raising awareness to the issue, particularly in US states with large Armenian communities like California, Massachusetts, and New York. Similar campaigns have been effective in other refugee crises, particularly at crowdfunding donations. Crowdfunded micro-loan platforms like Kiva have also proven effective at providing financial assistance to under-served populations for specific expenses like education and agriculture,

[98] "United States Announces Expanded Support for Armenia," Press Release, 2024, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-10-2024-united-states-announces-expanded-support-armenia.

[99] "Joint Statement on U.S.-Armenia Strategic Dialogue Capstone," Office of the Spokesperson, June 11, 2024, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-u-s-armenia-strategic-dialogue-capstone/.

[100] "Schiff and 47 Bipartisan Representatives Call for Swift Action to Protect Armenian Cultural Heritage Sites in Nagorno-Karabakh," US House of Representatives - Adam Schiff - Press Releases, June 26, 2024.

including in Georgia.[101] A wealthy and connected diaspora is a unique resource not available to Georgia or Armenia. In leveraging its potential, the Armenian government could increase vital assistance without straining domestic resources. However, even with these steps, Nagorno-Karabakh refugees face a long road ahead.

Conclusion

Despite relative homogeneity with their host communities, many refugees in the South Caucasus face worse long-term socio-economic outcomes. Based on this analysis, recent Nagorno-Karabakh refugees in Armenia will likely face similar outcomes. The respective governments of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have attempted to overcome these barriers, through government programs, but have failed to achieve widespread success. Finding steady employment, affordable housing, and access to education and healthcare present significant barriers to integration, with communities still marginalized decades after a conflict. Contrary to existing examinations of refugees in both third country resettlement and local integration, in these cases integration stalls even when ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other cultural barriers are absent. This illuminates the South Caucasus as a critical case for the study of refugee integration, indicating that Cumulative Disadvantage is a key theoretical framework for understanding why such refugees remain marginalized.

Nagorno-Karabakh refugees in Armenia face an uphill battle in achieving socio-economic stability and integrating into broader society. While external actors like the UNHCR have provided crucial immediate aid, and policies like the temporary protected status, payment systems, and option for full citizenship remove legal barriers, more is necessary to address the long-term needs

[101] "Loans That Change Lives | Georgia," 2024, https://www.kiva.org/lend/filter?country=GE&noScroll=true&noAnalytics=true.

of refugees. Armenia should pursue a three-pronged approach: continued engagement with international NGOs, domestic programs aiding refugee employment, and outreach to the diaspora. This strategy builds on the current approach while utilizing a key resource unique to Armenia in the South Caucasus.

Armenia's refugee crisis serves as a warning to those who overestimate the impact of homogeneity on integration. The examples of the South Caucasus, and the broader post-Soviet Union sphere, clearly demonstrate that theoretically "ideal" conditions do not ensure smooth integration. On the contrary, it indicates that a new understanding of refugee integration is necessary. As the number of displaced people around the world continues to grow, policymakers should fully appreciate the multifaceted nature of refugee integration to effectively address the challenges posed by these complex societal issues.

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Spanish Unemployment as a Factor of Emigration

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Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between Spain's national unemployment rate and emigration patterns. The findings provide statistically significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H_0*), which posits that the national unemployment rate has no effect on emigration from Spain. Instead, the analysis supports the alternative hypothesis (*H_A*) that higher unemployment rates are associated with increased emigration. That is, there is a correlation between the unemployment rate and emigration, meaning Spaniards do emigrate due to the high national unemployment. The paper highlights the unprecedented levels of unemployment in Spain and suggests that while much research has focused on youth unemployment, there is a critical need for further exploration of the experiences of the adult workforce, particularly in relation to emigration. Additionally, the study calls for future research into the effectiveness of policies implemented to mitigate unemployment, particularly in the context of EU (European Union) funding and structural investments in Spain. Given Spain's significant position in the global economy, placed as fourth largest in the EU with a GDP of $1.4 trillion, the loss of talent through emigration could undermine long-term competitiveness. This research contributes to the ongoing scholarly discourse on the relationship between unemployment and emigration and emphasizes the importance of policy intervention to address these interconnected challenges in Spain.*

Keywords: Spain, economy, emigration, unemployment, European Union

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Introduction

Since 1986, Spain has continued being a prominent member of the European Union. With its vast territory and large population size, Spain is the fourth largest economy in the EU, with a GDP of $1.4 trillion.[1] However, despite this, Spain has been struggling with high unemployment rates for decades. With an unemployment rate of 11.6%, Spain has the highest rate among Europe's top five economies.[2] Though this is the country's lowest rate in 15 years, it is still almost double the European average.[3] One potential effect of high unemployment that has aroused considerable debate is the increase in Spanish emigration. As of 2023, a total of 2,790,317 Spaniards live abroad, which is almost double the 2009 number of 1,471,691.[4]

Scholars, both Spanish and international, generally advance two theories pertaining to the relationship between unemployment rates and emigration. The Main Factor School of thought claims that unemployment is the main incentive for emigration. Adherents of this school of thought believe high unemployment rate is a significant push factor in emigration specifically among the youth population. A different approach, held by the Other Factors School of thought, claims that high unemployment is not the chief cause of emigration. To adherents of this school of thought, other factors - such as unemployment benefits, social norms and expectations, and connections

[1]Pallavi Rao, "These are the EU countries with the largest economies," World Economic Forum, February 1, 2023, www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/02/eu-countries-largest-economies-energy-gdp/.

[2]Emilio Sánchez Hidalgo. "Why does Spain continue to lead Europe in unemployment?" El País, August 3, 2023, https://english.elpais.com/spain/2023-08-02/why-does-spain-continue-to-lead-europe-in-unemployment.html#?prm=copy_link.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Agencia Servimedia, "Récord histórico del número de españoles que viven fuera: ya son casi 2,8 millones," *El País*, March 16, 2023, https://elpais.com/sociedad/2023-03-16/record-historico-del-numero-de-espanoles-que-viven-fuera-ya-son-casi-28-millones.html#?prm=copy_link.

with other emigrants - are the main causes of emigration. In order to contribute to the academic literature on this topic and to answer whether it is the high Spanish unemployment rate that causes Spaniards to leave their country, this paper will review literature to evaluate existing scholarly works and to collect preliminary information on Spanish unemployment and emigration. Then, using the hypothesis that the unemployment rate of Spain is causally related to the number of people leaving Spain, i.e. emigration, I will analyze the existing research data and conduct a regression analysis. Lastly, I will draw conclusions, acknowledge any shortcomings, and make recommendations for future research improvement.

Literature Review

In the Main Factor School, scholars Lester, García Pérez, and Vall Castello argue that the high unemployment rate in Spain is chiefly among the well-educated youth, thereby acting as a direct contributor to a phenomenon called the youth exodus. In the context of Spain, this exodus refers to when young people leave the country in search of better opportunities.Lester links this to the 2008 financial crisis, during which Spain's primary sources of income—the construction and tourism industries—were the first to be affected, resulting in the elimination of about 2 million jobs.[5] She compares Spain's GDP per capita and unemployment rates to those of Germany, a major destination country for Spanish youth. Lester then analyzes these factors as push and pull factors, or the reasons for people leaving their home countries and the reasons that attract them to a new location, respectively. Before 2008, the unemployment rate in Spain was lower than in Germany,

[5] Stephanie Lester, "'La Generación Ni Ni' and the Exodus of Spanish Youth," *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union*, vol. 2012 (2013): 138. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/12/.

but by 2010, Spain's overall unemployment rate was 20.4% as compared to Germany's 6.6%.[6] Using this comparison, combined with Spain's 51% unemployment rate for ages under 25, she claims that the well-educated youth are choosing to migrate to Germany due to its low total unemployment rate, higher GDP per capita, and need for skilled workers, all of which contribute to better opportunities for starting a career with strong prospects.[7] Thus, Lester concludes that the Spanish youth exodus is in line with the neoclassical economic theory, thereby suggesting unemployment rate can be an important factor in influencing international migration. Other scholars in this school come to the same conclusion, but in different ways.

García Pérez and Vall Castello only differ from Lester's analysis in their focus. They place significant emphasis on temporary contracts as a cause of unemployment, which then leads to emigration. While acknowledging the youth unemployment rate of over 50%, they emphasize that the youth who do work mainly do so under unstable conditions, meaning they can be jobless in an instant. Over the last 25 years, temporary contracts became the "basic hiring norm" in the Spanish economy and are practically the only type of employment offered to the young.[8] Spain's rate of young workers hired under temporary contracts - averaging around 67% for the 15 years leading

[6]Ibid, 142.

[7]Ibid, 138, 142.

[8]José Ignacio García Pérez and Judit Vall Castello, "Youth unemployment in Spain: More issues than just high unemployment," in *No Country for Young People? Youth Labour Market Problems in Europe*, ed. Juan J. Dolado (Centre for Economic Policy Research Press, 2015), 119, www.cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/60250-no_country_for_young_people_youth_labour_market_problems_in_europe.pdf.

up to the beginning of the 2008 recession- is far above the rate of other countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[9]

Though some may argue that temporary contracts have benefits, García Pérez and Vall Castello claim that these contracts help reduce long-term employment prospects of the youth because they promote less stable employment. García Pérez and Vall Castello utilize a cohort regression discontinuity design, which is a statistical method to study the effect(s) of a treatment when there is a clear cutoff point in time. In this case, the treatment is the labor market reform, which the Spanish government introduced in 1984 (the clear cutoff point) to eliminate the requirement that temporary contracts be linked to temporary activities.[10] The scholars use this design to evaluate cohorts of workers who entered the labor market right before and right after the reform, with controls for experience and time fixed effects to assess the long-term impact of temporary contracts on earnings and employment. They found that workers who entered the labor market after temporary contracts became the "basic hiring norm" in 1984 experienced lower accumulated workdays and lower accumulated earnings over their subsequent careers.[11] "About 38% of temporary workers in Spain (and one out of every two young people employed in 2007) have lost their job during the last seven years, whereas only eight out of every 100 permanent

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid, 120.

[11]Ibid, 121.

employees have lost their jobs during the same period."[12] This chronic job insecurity and instability, therefore, leads to the youth leaving the country to seek better opportunities.

Just as the literary works mentioned above, scholars Rakauskienė and Ranceva also contend that the youth are the most susceptible to emigration, mentioning unemployment as one of the main causes. However, they also attribute it to poverty, poor quality of life, problems related to education, and difficult political situations. Rakauskienė and Ranceva focus on Lithuania for this case study, but also make mention of other EU members and other global statistics. Throughout the paper, they use data from Eurostat and Statistics Lithuania to corroborate their argument. They emphasize that youth unemployment is a major threat, warning that inaction can lead to "extremism, outbreaks of social unrest, and destroy the hope of sustainable economic growth,"[13] which is also a point made by Lester, who mentions that national Spanish newspapers have acknowledged this youth exodus of more than 300,000 young Spaniards leaving the country to be a crisis.[14] The majority of these immigrants are young, highly qualified engineers, architects, and computer scientists,and is a cause for concern in the Spanish community.[15]

Rakauskienė and Ranceva state that this same phenomenon is happening in Lithuania: young people emigrate right after graduation, which not only means loss of investment in their education, but also represents a detriment to the future competitiveness of the country, which is

[12]Ibid, 120.

[13] Ona Gražina Rakauskienė and Olga Ranceva, "Youth Unemployment and Emigration Trends," *Intellectual Economics* 8, no. 1 (2014): 166, https://doi.org/10.13165/IE-14-8-1-12.

[14]Lester, "'La Generación NiNi,'"139.

[15]Ibid.

measured by economic performance, labor productivity, and government efficiency, etc.[16] Furthermore, they add that the youth are accepting any types of jobs, regardless of whether they match their education or experience. The youth is also engaging in seasonal jobs, which leads to them not having a stable income source and thus being unable to plan a future.[17] This will increasingly affect Spain's competitiveness as "the Spanish rate of young people not in employment, education or training (as a percentage of the total population) is currently among the highest in Europe."[18] This is exactly what was previously mentioned by García Pérez and Vall Castello.

The Other Factors School of thought, on the other hand, is characterized by the collective agreement that unemployment is not the chief factor of emigration. Scholars Antolin and Bover use a pooled sample of 664 migrant Spanish men aged 16 to 70 who were in the labor force both at the time of the survey and a year before to assess the push factors that make or prevent people from migrating.[19] They find that the most important factors in making a migration decision are family characteristics, such as being married to a working woman, having children, or living with relatives (particularly important in Spain where family bonds are strong), and individual employment situations, such as being registered or unregistered as unemployed in the Official

[16]Gražina Rakauskienė and Ranceva, "Youth Unemployment and Emigration Trends," 168.

[17]Ibid, 174.

[18]García Pérez and Vall Castello, "Youth unemployment in Spain: More issues than just high unemployment," 124.

[19]Pablo Antolin and Olympia Bover, "Regional Migration in Spain: The Effect of Personal Characteristics and of Unemployment, Wage and House Price Differentials Using Pooled Cross-Sections," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 59, no. 2 (1997): 220, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0084.00061.

Employment Office.[20] Registered unemployed people receive unemployment benefits, whereas unregistered unemployed people do not. The authors also note that age and education level are factors, too, making migration more popular among the younger and more educated.[21] This matches the findings of the scholars of the Main Factors School. However, their argument places a heavy emphasis on employment registration status; only unregistered unemployed people respond to higher unemployment in their region by moving, while those who are registered do not because of unemployment benefits.[22] They, then, conclude from these findings that individuals do not utilize migration as a response to their own employment nor to the high unemployment in their regions.

Also advocating for the Other Factors School of thought with a focus on Spain is scholar Soto Márquez, who argues that Spanish emigrants actually only leave temporarily. To prove this, he conducted two years of ethnographic observations and 135 in-depth interviews with Spanish immigrants in New York City, Buenos Aires, and London. Soto Márquez finds that well over 90 percent of interviewees have both a plan and desire to return to Spain.[23] He explains that these Spaniards left because the Spanish government encourages them to embark on "la aventura," or the adventure of going abroad.[24] "Spain heavily encourages university students to participate in

[20]Ibid, 222.

[21]Ibid, 221.

[22]Ibid, 226.

[23]José G. Soto Márquez, "The New Spanish Exodus: Transatlantic Migration, Identity, and Labor Pathways of a Global Generation in an Anti-Global Era" (PhD diss., New York University, 2023), 29, 168, ProQuest (29999542), https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/new-spanish-exodus-transatlantic-migration/docview/2785191854/se-2.

[24]Ibid, 168.

the Erasmus program for studying abroad within the eurozone. The vast majority of interviewees, across all sites, reported having migrated abroad before via Erasmus and/or a short-term migration after graduating from university."[25]

Soto Márquez adds that emigration is simply just a rite of passage for Spaniards, as a test of whether or not they can make it in "the real world" without the help and stability of their families.[26] They want to successfully establish themselves in a career path and prove that they can come back to Spain having done what they set out to do when they left the country. He concludes that Spanish emigrants truly believe that their migration is only temporary as they express that the quality of life in Spain is superior. Many quality of life elements were deemed "better" in Spain by most interviewees, ranging from "food" to "weather," and even "street cleanliness."[27] He quotes one of his interviewees, Jaime, who emigrated to London, saying that "[London] won't be home; it's just a way to save some money for our real home [Spain]."[28]

Lastly, scholars Moraru and Muntele also argue that emigration is more favored among accessibility and links with people that have already experienced emigration. They do still acknowledge unemployment as a potential factor for emigration, but not for their case study of Bacău County, Romania. Here, they say Catholicism was the factor that created these strong links between individuals and communities, with Catholics being the "pioneers of Moldovan

[25]Ibid, 183.

[26]Ibid, 184.

[27]Ibid, 175.

[28]Ibid.

migration."[29] To corroborate their arguments, they use statistical data provided by the National Institute of Statistics and put the data into the form of cartography. Furthermore, they state that the eastern area of Bacău registers low percentages of emigration due to the predominant elderly population having weak links with the emigrant population.[30] They conclude that a link between emigrants facilitates emigration; the decision to leave one's country is easier when getting support from other emigrants, the example here being the emigrant connections created by Catholicism.[31] This point is also supported by Soto Márquez, who says that chain emigration is usually increased due to the creation of virtual enclaves, which are groups "particularly on Facebook and Whatsapp that have a positive social media bias in depictions of migratory success."[32] Essentially, emigrants who have positive emigration stories post in these so-called enclaves, sharing their positive perceptions of migratory success with those back in Spain who are deciding whether they want to leave and likely get influenced to do so.

Theory and Hypothesis

The unemployment rate of Spain, which is the independent variable (IV) is causally related to the number of people leaving Spain, i.e. emigration, which is the dependent variable (DV). This is because people use the national unemployment rate as a measure of the economy, which is an indicator of the country's success. As a result, when the economy performs well there are more

[29]Andreea Moraru and Ionel Muntele, "Emigration and Unemployment in Bacău County, Romania: To What Extent Is There an Interaction Between the Two Phenomena?" *Ecoforum Journal* 4, no. 2 (2015): 151, www.ecoforumjournal.ro/index.php/eco/article/viewFile/198/126.

[30]Ibid, 151.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Soto Márquez, "The New Spanish Exodus," 30.

jobs in the market, which incentivizes people to stay in Spain. However, when the national economy is performing poorly, people are more likely to move to another country with a lower unemployment rate in order to increase their likelihood of finding a job and situating themselves in a state with a better, more stable economy. Thus, the high national unemployment rate is a measure of the Spanish economy, and when the economy struggles for long periods of time, people start looking for alternatives in this case, leaving their country. Based on my theory, I maintain that Spain's high unemployment rate causes its inhabitants to make the decision to emigrate, so I hypothesize the following:

H_A: When the national unemployment rate is high, the number of people emigrating from Spain increases.

H_0: The national unemployment rate has no effect on whether people emigrate from Spain.

Methodology

In order to test the hypotheses I have formulated above, I conducted in-depth observations on previously collected data. For unemployment rates, I looked at data provided by the International Monetary Fund for the years 1980-2022. For emigration, I utilized data collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España (National Statistics Institute). In the latter dataset, for which the only available years of data are 2008-2022, I listed both the emigration of Spaniards (people with Spanish citizenship) and the total emigration (all nationalities + Spaniards), but I will mainly focus on the total (see table 1).

Table 1: Unemployment Rate and Emigration in Spain by Year, 1980-2023.[33]

Year	Unemployment Rate in Spain (Percent)	Emigration of Spaniards (Thousands)	Total Emigration (Thousands)
1980	11.0	No data	No data
1981	13.8	No data	No data
1982	15.8	No data	No data
1983	17.2	No data	No data
1984	19.9	No data	No data
1985	21.3	No data	No data
1986	20.9	No data	No data
1987	20.2	No data	No data
1988	19.2	No data	No data
1989	17.2	No data	No data
1990	16.2	No data	No data
1991	16.3	No data	No data

[33]"Migraciones exteriores (resultados nacionales): Flujo de emigración con destino al extranjero por semestre, sexo, grupo de edad y nacionalidad (2008-2022)," Instituto Nacional de Estadística, accessed April 29, 2024, https://www.ine.es/up/uQywHX0ai1; "World Economic Outlook (April 2024): Unemployment Rate," International Monetary Fund, accessed April 29, 2024, www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@WEO/ESP.

1992	18.4	No data	No data
1993	22.6	No data	No data
1994	24.1	No data	No data
1995	22.9	No data	No data
1996	22.1	No data	No data
1997	20.6	No data	No data
1998	17.0	No data	No data

1999	15.6	No data	No data
2000	13.9	No data	No data
2001	10.5	No data	No data
2002	11.5	No data	No data
2003	11.5	No data	No data
2004	11.0	No data	No data
2005	9.2	No data	No data
2006	8.5	No data	No data
2007	8.2	No data	No data

2008	11.2	18.1	134.7
2009	17.9	18.6	184.1
2010	19.9	19.7	197.0
2011	21.4	26.3	200.6
2012	24.8	25.8	212.5
2013	26.1	36.4	269.7
2014	24.4	39.1	199.6
2015	22.1	48.4	173.1
2016	19.6	47.5	166.8
2017	17.2	44.3	197.1
2018	15.3	40.6	169.1

2019	14.1	33.7	137.4
2020	15.5	40.3	130.4
2021	14.8	35.7	197.4
2022	12.9	37.0	220.4

To establish whether there is statistical significance to support a relationship between the variables, I performed a bivariate linear regression using Microsoft Excel. This type of regression is a statistical method used to explore the relationship between two variables (i.e. how emigration, the dependent variable, changes when unemployment rate, the independent variable, changes). I chose this type of regression analysis not only because it is the one I am most familiar with, but also because it is simple and less time-consuming – which was essential due to the time constraints I faced as I was given one semester to complete this research. This method was also the most relevant to my research objective; I wanted to statistically assess the relationship between two variables, i.e. direction (positive or negative based on the sign of r value) and strength (numeric value of r, for which values closer to 0 are weaker than values close to -1 and +1). To make a conclusive decision about my hypotheses, I set the alpha level to 0.05 as the threshold of statistical significance (meaning there is a 5% probability that the results could have occurred by chance). If the p-value is under 0.05, it would be generally considered statistically significant and would give me sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H_0): The national unemployment rate has no effect on whether people emigrate from Spain. Lastly, I want to note that it is necessary to make these calculations because r can indicate a correlation between variables, but alone is not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis (H_0) and support the alternative (H_A). The p-value is needed to determine the statistical significance of my findings. I performed all of these calculations with Microsoft Excel as well.

Evaluation of Findings

The Pearson's correlation coefficient, r, for this bivariate regression is 0.612, indicating a strong positive relationship between unemployment and emigration in Spain. I created a visual representation of this data in the form of a scatter plot (15 points with a line of best fit), with unemployment and emigration figures from 2008-2022 (see fig. 1).




Figure 1: Total Emigration in Thousands vs. Unemployment Rate in Spain, 2008-2022.[34]

The p-value is 0.015, thus indicating statistical significance as it is under the alpha level of 0.05. In other words, there's evidence to suggest that the relationship between the variables is unlikely to be purely due to chance. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H_0): The national unemployment rate has no effect on whether people emigrate from

[34]Instituto Nacional de Estadística, "Migraciones exteriores (resultados nacionales)"; International Monetary Fund "World Economic Outlook (April 2024): Unemployment Rate."

Spain. Consequently, this means there is sufficient evidence to support the alternative hypothesis (H_A): When the national unemployment rate is high, the number of people emigrating from Spain increases. In addition to this, because r (0.612) is positive, I can confidently state that the variables are positively related: as the unemployment rate increases, emigration figures also tend to increase.

For a more visual representation of my findings, I created two figures utilizing the previously collected data (see table 1): Unemployment Rate by Year (see fig. 2) and Total Emigration (Spaniards vs. All Nationalities) by Year (see fig. 3).




Figure 2: Unemployment Rate by Year, 1980-2024.[35]

[35]International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook (April 2024): Unemployment Rate."




Figure 3: Total Emigration (Spaniards vs. All Nationalities) by Year

From 2008-2013, the unemployment rate skyrocketed in Spain, and so did emigration: unemployment stood at 11.2% and emigration at 134.7 thousand in 2008, both reaching new highs of 26.1% and 269.7 thousand, respectively, in 2013 (see table 1). For fig. 3, I subtracted the emigration of Spaniards (see table 1) from the total emigration (see table 1) to achieve the number of non-Spaniard emigrations, which is shown in yellow in fig. 3. I explain the importance of making this distinction below.

For future research, I believe it is important to make the distinction between Spaniard emigrations and all other emigrations because they may not be exactly related; in 2011-12, 2016-17, and 2020-21, emigration of Spaniards decreased while that of other nationalities increased, and in 2013-14 and 2019-20, emigration of Spaniards increased while that of other nationalities decreased (see fig. 3). People of other nationalities who live in Spain may have moved there

temporarily, such as for an educational or professional opportunity, and could be leaving Spain to go back to their home country. The majority of Spaniards on the other hand, were born and raised in Spain with their families. However, many Spanish citizens may emigrate to pursue an educational or professional opportunity abroad, or as a rite of passage to test one's ability to make it in the "real world".[36] Therefore, it is important to differentiate between them, as they may have different reasons for emigrating, either due to or regardless of unemployment rates.

Moreover, though there is support for my alternative hypothesis, there are also shortcomings with the data and inconsistencies. For one, there is no emigration data available prior to 2008 (see table 1). This is detrimental as I cannot compare the emigration numbers to the unemployment rate for more than 15 points, which is unfortunate as there is data for the latter dating back to 1980 (see table 1). For the future, it would be essential that more data is collected.

Another inconsistency is the eurozone crisis and the global financial crisis, the effects of which include both higher unemployment and higher emigration from 2008-2013 (see fig. 2 and fig.3). The crisis was the result of a combination of domestic problems in what became known as the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), a derogatory term to describe the unfortunate economic state of those EU countries.[37] Before the euro was introduced, poorer EU states such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland had to pay more than wealthier members to borrow money, so they were basically forced to live within their means. However, after the euro's introduction, all countries could borrow at the same cheaper rate; thus, these poorer countries started living way

[36]Soto Márquez, "The New Spanish Exodus," 184.

[37]John McCormick, *European Union Politics* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 355.

beyond their means, using their new access to cheap credit to buy imports and build houses while exporting less.[38] Due to the crisis being relatively recent and its effects having lingered, adding the potential presence of confounding variables into the question, we would need a lot more data points to accurately measure the relationship between unemployment and emigration. The current data is too limited.

Lastly, as mentioned before by Soto Márquez in the Other Factors School, emigration could also be owed largely to educational opportunities. Mobilization of students and academic staff within the EU is extremely facilitated by educational programs such as Erasmus +, for example, which was launched in 2014 to offer a myriad of opportunities for study abroad and educational exchange.[39] This generation of European students who go abroad to study, about 250,000 per year, received the name of Erasmus Generation. They are seen as leaders in the effort to build an European identity by learning new languages and immersing themselves in the culture of other European countries. Within three years, more than 3 million students had participated in Erasmus, developing a new "European," one that is younger, better educated, more cosmopolitan, more strongly identified as European. Educational programs across the EU were also facilitated by the Bologna Process, which standardized higher education credits among European universities based on the European Credit Transfer Accumulation System.[40] This led to more students being able to study abroad without challenges to credit equivalence, and as of 2016, Spain was among the top 5

[38]Ibid, 356.

[39]Ibid, 373.

[40]Ibid.

EU home countries of abroad students.[41] This, I believe, could be just as large a factor of emigration as the unemployment rate. I suggest future researchers perform analysis on the relationship between education as a reason for emigration.

Conclusion

After conducting a literature review, finding and analyzing previously collected data, and performing a bivariate linear regression, there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H_0): The national unemployment rate has no effect on whether people emigrate from Spain. By rejecting the null, there is evidence to support the alternative hypotheses (H_A): When the national unemployment rate is high, the number of people emigrating from Spain increases.

It is clear that unemployment has reached unprecedented levels in Spain. There is a deep concern about the historically high unemployment rate – rightfully so. However, though research has been done on the subject, more research should be conducted in the future.

Future researchers should address the lack of in-depth mention of the overall Spanish unemployment, which would include adults, as all three of the literary works in the Main Factor School focus primarily on youth unemployment. While it poses a threat to the younger generations and brings up more debate, it is important to also acknowledge and include the adult population's experience with unemployment, too, especially as their ability to emigrate may be lesser than that of younger people.

[41]Ibid, 376.

An additional point for future research would be to explore what Spain has been doing to mitigate the high unemployment. In 1985 and 1994, unemployment was also above 20%, which was well before the eurozone crisis. Yet, by 2008, unemployment was at 8%. It would be interesting to see what specific policies were put in place, measure their success, and compare them to current policies, especially as Spain has been among the top three recipients of EU structural spending between 2014-2020. Spain has received about 20 billion euros from the European Regional Development Fund, which targets imbalances between EU regions, including investments in innovation, research, and businesses, as well as about 7 billion euros from the European Social Fund, which focuses on creating jobs and worker mobility, combating long-term unemployment, and providing aid to workers in adapting to technological changes.[42] Future research should focus on what Spain has been doing with this funding.

Overall, I am very satisfied with the research I have conducted and believe that this will contribute to the scholarly debate on the topic of unemployment and emigration in Spain. Spain has a very large economy (fourth largest in the EU and fourteenth largest in the world) which places the country in a favorable position on the world stage. Thus, it is important that the Spanish government takes measures to prevent younger, well-educated generations as well as the rest of the workforce from leaving and taking their talents elsewhere. High emigration could mean loss of investment in their education and represent a detriment to the future competitiveness of the country.

[42]Ibid, 366-7.

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The Old and the New Guards:

The Democratic Party of Japan's Shift to the Right and Its Implications for the Constitutional Democratic Party

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Abstract

Both the Jiyū-Minshutō or Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the Minshutō or Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) have complicated histories. This paper sheds light on both of their times in power starting from the end of Koizumi's term in 2006. It compares the two parties and applies its conclusions to the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), the LDP's current rival. The main policy areas covered for both parties are energy, welfare, foreign affairs, as well as bureaucracy and government respectively. While describing each party during the given time periods in office and breaking down the descriptions by prime minister, the paper highlights a noticeable rightward shift in the DPJ, aligning itself more closely to the LDP's values. By analyzing the shifts in policy and reform, the paper illuminates how the DPJ had lost its grip on power because it lost the core of its voter base, leading to the LDP's resurgence under Shinzo Abe. There is then a comparison with the 2012-2020 LDP and the DPJ to analyze if any policies were co-opted by either side. The paper ends by applying the lessons the DPJ had learned during its time in power to the current day CDP, some of which the CDP may be able to draw from.

Key Words: Bureaucracy, Energy Policy, Democratic Party of Japan, Constitutional Democratic Party

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Introduction

Yukio Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) compatriots celebrated their victory in 2009. Their party had just won a landslide victory against the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The DPJ had promised a new order in Japan, but by 2012 the DPJ looked more like the LDP than the trailblazing party it once thought itself to be. Now, with Noda Yoshihiko as the head of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), which is considered by most to be the successor to the DPJ, it is essential to ask the question of how the DPJ began to align itself with LDP over time.[1] During its time in power from 2009 to 2012, the structures, policies, and reforms of the DPJ took a shift to the right, resembling LDP policies rather than retaining its reputation as an opposition party. This shift provides a valuable lesson to the CDP and all other opposition parties in the process.

2006-2009 LDP

Party and Government Structure

Before the DPJ took power, the LDP spent decades setting up a system slanted in their favor. This system manifested itself through its party and government organization, as well as within the bureaucracy. Within the party, the Policy Research Council (PRC) allowed for pre-approved bills drafted mostly by the bureaucracy to be passed by the legislature (referred to as the Diet). Within the bureaucracy, former bureaucrats would either gain positions as heads of companies that requested LDP favors or become politicians themselves.[2] This pattern changed with the inauguration of Junichiro Koizumi, prime minister from 2001-2006, who instituted a

[1]The Asahi Shimbun, "Noda Wins Presidential Election of Main Opposition CDP," The Asahi Shimbun, September 23, 2024, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15437371.
[2]K. Mishima, "A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins? The Civil Service Reform of 2014," *International Journal of Public Administration* 40, no. 13 (2017): 1102–1103, 1107, https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2016.1242615.

series of reforms to weaken the factions. While Koizumi implemented major changes, the scope of this paper will not cover his reforms, but rather the results and what happened to them after his time in office. Nevertheless, these changes regained popularity within the LDP from their pre-Koizumi days, mostly because of rollbacks of his reforms. Each aspect of this structure is critical to understanding the LDP and the system it conceptualized for policy creation.

Factions in the LDP have been responsible for both the dominance and corruption of the party since 1955. The factional system had barely changed from its post-war roots (except in the case of prime minister Hayato Ikeda who had managed to gain control over the factions to some extent)[3]. Each faction conducts fundraising individually, leading to the current crisis plaguing the LDP with election funds, highlighting the instability caused by factional autonomy.[4] This autonomy also creates a system where faction bosses are able to decide the LDP President, actively barring the people from choosing their leaders.[5] The sway held by faction bosses is still debated by many, as bosses are determined by elected officials who in turn are held accountable by the voters. Nevertheless, this means bosses have little to no accountability to the people. According to author Ko Mishima, these factions were sufficiently weakened by Koizumi for the 2006-2009 LDP era so most LDP lawmakers voted based on the politician and their ideology rather than along factional lines. However the factions still held some sway in both elections and other sectors of

[3]Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads : Conflict and Compromise after Anpo*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674988507, 75-76.
[4]Patrick Köllner, "Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties Revisited: How Do Factions in the LDP and the DPJ Differ?" *Japan Forum* 16, no. 1 (2004): 93, https://doi.org/10.1080/0955580032000189348; Naofumi Fujimura, "The LDP Slush Fund Scandal: What Will Make Politicians Accountable?" Kobe University, February 26, 2024, accessed May 9, 2024, www.kobe-u.ac.jp/en/news/article/20240226-21790/.
[5]K. Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships in the Post-Koizumi Era," *East Asia* 29 (2012): 287, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-012-9179-y.

government.[6] Much of the LDP's power also came from the bureaucracy working hand in hand with the power of the factions.

The bureaucracy worked with private companies, as well as within the LDP's own structure, to write legislation that would be pre-approved by politicians that were experts in their respective fields before being voted on in the Diet.[7] Bureaucrats would also be put in lofty private company positions after retirement, known as *amakudari*. This triangle: the bureaucracy, politicians, and businesses, continued to retain its power.[8] All these factors had a major impact on LDP policies, especially domestic ones, from 2006-2009.

Policies and Reform

Koizumi had successfully used the 1994 electoral reforms to his advantage, utilizing his popularity to circumvent special interest groups and factions in order to push through both popular and necessary reforms.[9] He had broken down the old faction-based system, prioritizing reform above the placation of faction leaders.[10] Shinzo Abe did not do this. Abe was very different from Koizumi, having gained national political prominence due to his father's role as foreign minister and Secretary General of the LDP, as well as his aggressive stance on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) kidnapping of Japanese citizens.[11] In the wake of Koizumi's resignation, Abe was selected as leader of the LDP because of his conservative views and his

[6]Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships," 282.
[7]Mishima, "A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins?" 1102, 1108.
[8]Mishima, "A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins?" 1109; Sota Kato, "Getting to the Root of Amakudari: Sweeping Reform Needed to Close the Revolving Door," The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, June 13, 2017, https://www.tokyofoundation.org/research/detail.php?id=409.
[9]Köllner, "Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties Revisited or How Do Factions in the LDP and the DPJ Differ?" 94; Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships," 286.
[10]"Japan's 'weird' PM Breaks Political Mold," NBC News, June 26, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna13547209
[11]Tobias S. Harris, *The Iconoclast : Shinzō Abe and the New Japan*. London: Hurst & Company, 2020, 34, 59, 89-94.

ability to balance with the party moderates. Nevertheless, he failed to galvanize popular support to stave off both factions and special interest groups, being the first of three prime ministers that would help lead to the fall of the LDP yet again. From 2006 to 2009, the LDP returned to its pre-Koizumi corrupted roots.

From 2006-2007, Shinzo Abe kept his popularity high but lost public support when he began to listen to the 'old guard', such as those who went against Koizumi and those who supported status-quo ideas, rather than to reformists.[12] While Koizumi had privatized the postal system, he also targeted those who voted against it and kicked them out from the party. Abe had reversed this trend, allowing them back into the party. A notable example of this inclusion is Moriyama, the LDP Secretary General in Shigeru Ishiba's Cabinet.[13] This reinclusion of former-LDP politicians began the trend where the Koizumi-era policies were undermined or reversed by each of his successors , empowering the once-weakened factions that had dominated the party. These frequent and jarring policy shifts positioned Koizumi as an aberration rather than what the LDP truly represented in history. There was one aspect of reform that Abe succeeded in, that being bureaucratic reform. Abe's legislation aimed to stop very blatant forms of *amakudari*, where former bureaucrats were funneled into businesses or nonprofits after they retired with the help of their ministry, helping stem corruption.[14]

[12]Ibid; R. Sahashi and J. Gannon, eds., *Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan* (Japan Center for International Exchange, 2015), 58; T. J. Pempel, "Between Pork and Productivity: The Collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party," *Japanese Journal of Sociology* 36, no. 2 (summer 2010): 249, https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758799.003.0002.
[13]Masami Ito, "LDP Allows Postal Rebels Back in Fold," *The Japan Times*, December 5, 2006, 4th edition, sec. Front Page; "New LDP Secretary General Moriyama Highly Skilled Negotiator," Kyodo News, September 30, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/09/c2d772884e04-profile-new-ldp-secretary-general-moriyama-highly-skilled-negotiator.html.
[14]Kato, "Getting to the Root of Amakudari."

Yasuo Fukuda, prime minister from 2007-2008 and the son of former prime minister Takeo Fukuda, worked to extend legislation to increase the time gasoline taxes would be collected for road construction. His cabinet went even further to promote a higher gas tax rate instead of an extension.[15] For the election, these changes positioned the LDP as a taxation-heavy party, which was especially detrimental during a time of political upheaval. It also emphasizes the discordant policy goals between Fukuda and his own cabinet. To Fukuda's credit, he did enact the bureaucratic reforms that Abe had already initiated, but their passages were almost guaranteed to go through regardless of leadership.[16] Fukuda lacked power to the point where he was not even in complete control of his own government, relying on the bureaucracy for legislative matters.[17]

Taro Aso then became prime minister from 2008-2009, a former foreign minister as well as a more radical thinker on foreign policy (e.g. his reconsideration of Japan's no-nuclear policy).[18] Aso did not have much time to focus on any non-pressing policy sectors due to the 2008 financial crisis, shifting his main goal to passing a new budget.[19] He openly questioned Koizumi's postal reforms and boosted public-works budgets, going against many of the reforms Koizumi had tried to implement.[20] While not a direct problem, this legislative dissonance caused the government deficit to go up. The policies of these three prime ministers display a reversion from the policies of Koizumi under Abe and Fukuda, but also the lack of consistent focus and consistency during the three years, ceding power to bureaucrats and LDP politicians yet again .

[15]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership,* 62-63; Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships," 287.
[16]Mishima, "A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins?" 1103.
[17]Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships," 287.
[18]Richard Cronin, "Abe Shinzo, New Nationalism and the Future of Sino-Japanese Relations," *Stimson*, October 20, 2010, 1–6, https://www.stimson.org/2010/abe-shinzo-new-nationalism-and-future-sino-japanese-relations/.
[19]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership,* 65-67.
[20]Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships," 288.

Summarizing the time of the LDP from 2006-2009, there were some general trends that took place. The trend towards nuclear energy remained positive, with an expectation for nuclear power to continue to grow over time.[21] As highlighted by Abe, Fukuda, and especially Aso, welfare remained corrupt in nature, with public works projects supplanting any semblance of modern welfare systems. The 2006-2009 LDP set the baseline for bureaucratic influence, which grew under Fukuda and Aso. Finally, none of these prime ministers challenged the US military stationed in Japan, especially in Okinawa. A lack of cohesion from one prime minister to the next, alongside each prime minister's unwillingness to take charge against interest groups, such as the bureaucracy and factions, weakened the overall state of the party and its ability to solve issues through the executive office of the prime minister. All these failures, both by action and inaction, helped pave the way for the DPJ's 2009 victory.

2009-2012 DPJ

Party and Government Structure

While the DPJ was in power, they both implemented and subsequently reversed great reform in party structures. The party came to power on a platform of change, aiming to adjust policies within many sectors of both the government and society. However, their first priority was the bureaucracy. Following up on their election-time promises, the DPJ began implementing reforms to limit bureaucratic influence in the policy making process; however, they did not focus much on faction reforms.

First and most importantly, the DPJ still had factions like the LDP. For instance, Ichiro Ozawa's split from the DPJ was amplified because he had a good amount of DPJ House of

[21]Katharina Buchholz, "How Fukushima Changed Japan's Energy Mix," Statista, March 11, 2021, https://www.statista.com/chart/18679/electricity-generated-in-japan-by-source/.

Representatives members in his faction. [22] Ozawa had been the frontrunner back in 2007 to take over as prime minister after the LDP's failures led to electoral losses, but he failed to gain the seat of DPJ President. [23] These factions in the DPJ were more personalized rather than institutionalized as the LDP factions, as shown by Ozawa.[24] Another way to look at DPJ factions is to view them as groups; they are ways that politicians associated themselves, but not acting as semi-independent actors, in contrast to the LDP factions.[25] Overall, factions, or groups, were important for some key splits in the party, but not as influential as those in the LDP.

The significance of bureaucratic reforms was the reduction of its influence, but also resulted in less legislative expertise during the bill drafting process. Politicians no longer worked with bureaucrats, but rather alongside fellow politicians, removing valuable expertise from the drafting process. This led to one of the most major shake ups in the structuring of the party, especially with the dissolution of the PRC.

A long process was necessary to get suggestions from constituents to politicians through the DPJ government framework. There were no direct lines of communication to the ministers in the government, meaning that everything went through the Office of the Secretary General (OSG). While labeled PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council) in the figure, this system is the same as the PRC.[26] The PRC was a useful tool for a number of suggestions to go through the approval process before being given to ministers or bureaucrats.[27] In the DPJ, the OSG would be responsible

[22] Kenji E. Kushida and Philip Y. Lipscy, eds., *Japan under the DPJ: The Politics of Transition and Governance* (Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2013), 95–96.
[23]Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York, NY: The Century Foundation, 2007), 355.
[24]Köllner, "Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties Revisited or How Do Factions in the LDP and the DPJ Differ?" 88–89, 93.
[25]Mishima, "Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships," 282.
[26]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, xvii.
[27]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 166.

for all policy recommendations being filtered through to the politically appointed ministers rather than a portion of them. This led to lots of political oversight over the bureaucracy, specifically by a party that already did not believe in much, if any, value of the bureaucracy.[28] All these aspects helped influence reforms and policies of the DPJ until the very end.

Policies and Reform

DPJ policies revolved around four main areas: energy, the bureaucracy, welfare, and the US' military presence. The first DPJ leader in the office of prime minister from 2009-2010, part of a political dynasty which has been extremely influential in Japanese politics, was Yukio Hatoyama.[29] All four of the policy sectors listed, which Hatoyama preached about on his way into the prime minister's seat, radically changed over the course of the DPJ's three-year rule. It is important to note, however, that his opinion and reforms related to the bureaucracy did not shift until the latter half of Naoto Kan's tenure. First, the focus on energy shifted from nuclear to other renewables. Second, the bureaucracy was kicked out of a wide swathe policy making decisions at the beginning, crippling any type of influence they may have had until Naoto Kan's time in office from 2010-2011 as prime minister. Third, welfare goals were radically shifted once it was realized that they could not come up with the funds from their bureaucratic reforms. Finally, the beginning stance on the US' presence in Okinawa radically changed under Hatoyama and was never addressed after his administration during the DPJ's time in power. Even with a record low amount of legislation both proposed and passed, the DPJ did put forward some unique and important ideas and actions while in power[30].

[28] Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 154, 219.
[29] Itoh, Mayumi. "Hatoyama Kunio and Political Leadership in Japan: A Political Case Study." *Asian Survey* 39, no. 5 (1999): 721. https://doi.org/10.2307/3021164.
[30] Kushida and Lipscy, *Japan under the DPJ,* 21-24.

Energy and Bureaucracy

Similar to the LDP, the DPJ was initially committed to nuclear energy. The share of nuclear energy in total Japanese energy output had been growing since the 1970s.[31] This pattern continued until the Fukushima disaster, where a tsunami hit a nuclear reactor. The handling of the disaster was seen as inadequate, leading to Kan's resignation and Yoshihiko Noda's rise to the office of prime minister, whose tenure would last from 2011-2012[32].

The bureaucracy led a survey in the aftermath of the disaster, with a resounding 81% of respondents calling for an immediately nuclear-free Japan[33]. In light of this, the DPJ government prepared to phase out nuclear energy, with lobbying groups forming to challenge the DPJ's new stance[34]. Additionally, the DPJ withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2010 under Kan shortly after the Fukushima disaster, another discontinuity in the public policies of the DPJ from Hatoyama's time in office[35]. Kan's withdrawal showed that Japan, while removing nuclear energy from its energy makeup, would not aim to reduce carbon emissions. This meant that green energy would be reduced in Japan's overall energy mix, while carbon emissions would make up a greater share. The divide between bureaucrats, businesses, the DPJ government, and even within the government's own thinking could not have been more evident, helping cement the bureaucracy-government divide for a large portion of the DPJ administration.

[31]Buchholz, "How Fukushima Changed Japan's Energy Mix."
[32]Kushida and Lipscy, *Japan under the DPJ,* 439-440.
[33]Hiro Saito, "The Developmental State and Public Participation: The Case of Energy Policy-making in Post–Fukushima Japan," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 46, no. 1 (2021): 149, https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243920905000.
[34]Saito, "The Developmental State and Public Participation," 150.
[35]Takeo Hoshi and Philip Y. Lipscy, eds., *The Political Economy of the Abe Government and Abenomics Reforms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 446.

Bureaucrats and businesses alike fought against these reforms, pressuring the DPJ to accept a 25% nuclear energy mix of the total energy pool rather than no nuclear energy at all.[36] This sparked a debate in the Energy and Environmental Council (EEC).[37] Eventually, the EEC suggested going nuclear free; but due to the upcoming election, bureaucrats held off until the LDP victory in 2012, with Noda left waiting to choose a new energy makeup for the future.[38] While Noda did not have enough time to implement a new energy policy, it can be argued that he hoped to reopen nuclear plants, a policy plan in common with the LDP government, showing his personal tilt towards LDP policies as well as bureaucratic influence.[39] This is only one aspect of DPJ reforms, with another important aspect being the DPJ's view on bureaucracy, specifically with policy making and daily work rather than influence in the energy sector.

Policymaking and Bureaucracy

As noted earlier, the DPJ lacked the PRC that the LDP relied on for passing legislation. After its abolition, people were concerned whether a non-PRC based system would function well.[40] Through the DPJ system, Diet members could go to conferences and give their opinions on upcoming legislation, rather than having bureaucrats predetermine decisions.[41] It was through this process that bureaucratic expertise was limited in the drafting process. It seems that the DPJ's goal was to strengthen the government but did not know how to be as efficient as the LDP was in this

[36]Saito, "The Developmental State and Public Participation," 151.
[37]Saito, "The Developmental State and Public Participation," 151–152.
[38]Saito, "The Developmental State and Public Participation," 152.
[39]Ibid; Jane Nakano and David Pumphrey, "Japanese Energy Policy One Year Later," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 19, 2012, https://www.csis.org/analysis/japanese-energy-policy-one-year-later.
[40]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership*, 119; Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 155.
[41]Ibid.

respect. [42] This was not all that the DPJ wanted to accomplish, as one of their goals was to remove wasteful spending, especially in the bureaucracy.[43]

The DPJ viewed the bureaucracy as a wasteful, unaccountable, and corrupt entity. However, the DPJ did not completely shun the bureaucracy. They more so opposed the LDP's bureaucracy. Structures were overhauled to allow for political appointees instead of bureaucrats to run ministries.[44] While it allowed for more accountability to voters, it also meant that the appointees were overworked and could not handle all their tasks.[45] Information not only from bureaucrats to appointees, but also from ministry to ministry, was hindered. As stated by Shinoda, "The abolition of the administrative vice ministerial meeting also affected the power structure within the government". [46] While the meetings did enable the bureaucracy to hold power in the ministries, as the vice ministers usually dealt with internal matters while ministers, the political appointees by the DPJ, dealt with anything external. Regardless, the vice ministerial meetings were critical for information flow between ministries.[47] It also limited the Chief Cabinet Secretary from having connections to ministries, thereby blocking the link between the prime minister and ministries. All these issues led to a weakened prime minister and a semi-dysfunctional bureaucracy that struggled to coordinate amongst itself from ministry to ministry, as well as with the government.[48] But this is not to say that the bureaucracy and prime minister could not work together at all, as there are examples with some individual ministries.

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[42]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership*, 119.
[43]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 156.
[44]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 162.
[45]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 163.
[46]Ibid.
[47]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 162-164
[48]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 164-165

The DPJ worked with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to brainstorm on where unnecessary and wasteful spending could be eliminated.[49] Only two and a half trillion yen of the three trillion-yen goal could be cut, so the DPJ focused even harder on budget programs and to evaluate their necessity, while also working with the MOF to cut wasteful programs that could not be removed under the LDP due to the iron triangle mentioned earlier.[50] This lack of funding was one of the major problems with the DPJ's welfare policies, crippling their chances of success.

Welfare

Overall, the DPJ failed in many regards to keep their promises when it came to welfare, especially the economy and childcare plans.[51] As can be seen by the policies gathered by Kushida and Lipscy, Yukio Hatoyama was a very progressive politician while campaigning and as the first DPJ prime minister. While many policies were not accomplished during his tenure, he tried to accomplish them, albeit with a myriad of challenges.[52] During his time in office, Kan failed to pass the child allowance distribution bill and revised the DPJ's manifesto, slowly starting the shift to the right.[53] Under Noda, the DPJ shifted even further right. As a bureaucrat, he represented what the DPJ originally wanted to take down, and he took up LDP campaign goals, such as raising the consumption tax.[54] In this sense, it can be seen how the DPJ reneged on its promises and slowly adopted the policies of the LDP after Hatoyama's time in office.

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[49]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 156-157

[50]Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 157-159; Rob Fahey, "The End of the Iron Triangle and What it Means for Japanese Politics," JapanForward, March 1, 2017, https://japan-forward.com/the-end-of-the-iron-triangle-and-what-it-means-for-japanese-politics/#google_vignette.

[51]Kushida and Lipscy, *Japan under the DPJ,* 22-24.

[52]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership*, 70.

[53]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership*, 72-75.

[54]Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership*, 75-76.

Foreign Policy

Hatoyama's role as prime minister saw an attempt at base relocation in Okinawa which was abandoned after the US refused to negotiate.[55] Due to incidents involving the base, such as a helicopter crashing into a local university, followed by the US cordoning off the scene without allowing any Japanese officials inside, Hatoyama promised to move the base somewhere more manageable.[56] Incidents in the region, such as the sinking of the Cheonan by the DPRK, also influenced both sides, showing Japan the necessity of the base and leading to the eventual stall on the plan.[57] There was also resistance from native Okinawans to the idea of relocation to the north of the island and that Hatoyama's plan of relocation was very vague when developed.[58] No stance like this was taken under Kan or Noda. Kan's administration experienced no major events related to Okinawa or any territorial disputes to compare to. The same is true with Noda when relating to Okinawa, but not for other disputes. Under Noda, issues related to the Senkaku Islands came to a boil when Japanese nationalists claimed that the islands were rightfully Japanese and planted a flag on the island, and then nationalist governor of Tokyo Ishihara, promoting a campaign to buy the islands, prompting Noda to purchase the islands and restrict their access to any demonstrators.[59] These purchases angered the Chinese government, who claimed the islands. This shows the DPJ

[55]Paul O'Shea, "Overestimating the "Power Shift": The US Role in the Failure of the Democratic Party of Japan's "Asia Pivot," *Asian Perspective* 38 (2014): 436, 449.
[56]Glenn D. Hook, "The American Eagle in Okinawa: The Politics of Contested Memory and the Unfinished War," *Japan Forum* 27, no. 3 (June 11, 2015): 299–320, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2015.1042011, 302, 314; Masahiro Matsumura, "Okinawa and the Politics of an Alliance," *Survival* 53, no. 4 (August 1, 2011): 153–68, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.603567, 158-159.
[57]Ibid
[58]Ellis Krauss, "Crisis Management, LDP, and DPJ Style," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 14, no. 2 (May 10, 2013): 177–99, https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S1468109913000029, 182-184.
[59]Robert D. Eldridge, "Behind the Japanese Government's Purchase of the Senkaku Islands," *The Japan Times*, September 15,2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/09/15/commentary/japan-commentary/senkaku-islands/; Sahashi and Gannon, *Looking for Leadership*, 23-24; Justin McCurry, "Tokyo's Rightwing Governor Plans to Buy Disputed Senkaku Islands," The Guardian, April 19, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/tokyo-governor-senkaku-islands-china.

using the aggressive strategy of the LDP against China as well as the party's lack of diplomatic skill, while at the same time ignoring key policy promises related to Okinawa that Hatoyama went against.

Failures of the DPJ

All these about-faces in policy changes and failed leadership angered Japanese voters, causing the DPJ to lose the upper-house election in 2010 and the lower house election in 2012.[60] The main aspect of the election results is that the LDP did not win in 2012, but rather the DPJ lost, with record low turnouts being recorded at the polls.[61] This goes to show how the DPJ lost the election not because of the LDP's appeal to voters, but rather both the failures and broken promises of the DPJ.[62] Many of the LDP and DPJ policies during the election were either the same or similar, exemplified by the DPJ's shift to the right, becoming more like the LDP than any semblance of the opposition party they had once been.[63] Overall, the election was a disaster for the DPJ, ushering in a new LDP with an old face at its helm.

2012-2020 LDP and Comparison

Party and Government Structure

The PRC being reinstated immediately upon taking power shows the quick reversion back to pre-2009 policies, with an old guard Abe back in charge, even if it was due to the LDP

[60]"Japan's DPJ Loses Upper House Vote," AlJazeera, July 12, 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/12/japans-dpj-loses-upper-house-vote; Robert Pekkanen, "The 2012 Japanese Election Paradox: How the LDP Lost Voters and Won the Election," The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 18, 2012, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-2012-japanese-election-paradox-how-the-ldp-lost-voters-and-won-the-election/.
[61]Ibid.
[62]Leonard Schoppa, "Japan Chair Platform: A Vote against the DPJ, Not in Favor of the LDP," Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 18, 2012, https://www.csis.org/analysis/japan-chair-platform-vote-against-dpj-not-favor-ldp.
[63]Ibid.

Constitution;[64] but this old guard had learned new tricks. Likely taking after Koizumi's own strategy, Shinzo Abe returned to strengthen the office of Prime Minister by controlling the bureaucracy, factions, and internal LDP politics rather than insulating them from both himself and from each other.

Factions

Factions, still a key part of the LDP, have led to power bases forming for possible prime minister candidates, as shown by the Moritomo scandal where Abe avoided being kicked out of office because of a financial scandal, possibly thanks to his faction's influence.[65] Factions began to regain influence during the term of Abe as well, with many independent LDP lawmakers joining a faction.[66] Over time, these factions regained their original influence, not so much in the realm of policy drafting, but rather regaining the ability to halt bills they disliked as well as reobtaining policy experts in their own factions, allowing for more cabinet appointments and giving the opportunity for candidates for prime minister to have a base of support in the party.[67] Overall, while factions still held power over the selection of prime ministers and appointees to government positions, they had little publicity and had reverted to wielding their institutionalized power in the background.

Bureaucracy Over Time

[64]Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, "LDP Constitution," Lib Dems: Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2009, https://www.jimin.jp/english/about-ldp/constitution/104178.html.
[65]Rob Fahey, "Abe vs. Aso: The Moritomo Scandal Divides the LDP," *Tokyo Review*, March 12, 2018, https://tokyoreview.net/2018/03/abe-aso-moritomo-scandal/.
[66]Michael Macarthur Bosack, "Factional Politics Remain a Force in Japan," The Japan Times, July 30, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/07/30/commentary/japan-commentary/factional-politics-remain-force-japan/.
[67]Ibid.

In the bureaucracy, most committees that had been abolished came back to life, such as the Tax System Research Commission, with lobbying almost immediately taking place from businesses.[68] Bureaucrats are part of these committees, unlike the cabinet-run committees under the DPJ, showing a reversion to factional strength rather than the strength of the prime minister being shown through cabinet appointments.[69] One important part of the committees is that Abe reformed the bureaucracy to have more control over who is appointed to high positions, only leaving middle positions to possible corruption and elitism.[70]

This policy is in line with Abe's policies in his first term and those of Fukuda, but not with those of Aso as shown before. Within the DPJ, this is close to the ideas of Hatoyama, but less so Kan, and most definitely not those of Noda, as he was a former bureaucrat himself. The only meaningful structural change in the DPJ happened under Hatoyama, and no more changes were made under Kan or Noda, showing how the DPJ reverted into at least tolerating the usage of the bureaucracy and even using the MOF to help find places to cut spending.

Policies, Reforms, and Comparisons

First, for energy policies, this lack of continuity could be excused by the Fukushima Disaster under Prime Minister Kan of the DPJ. Before the disaster, both the LDP and DPJ were in favor of nuclear energy, as it gave Japan a good standing in the international climate circle and was a good look to garner voters that focused on environmental issues. After the disaster, widespread support for getting rid of nuclear energy meant that there may have been no other

[68]Katsuyuki Yakushiji, "Abe and the Triumph of the Old LDP," The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, February 15, 2013, https://www.tokyofoundation.org/research/detail.php?id=608.
[69]Japan Ministry of Finance, "The Tax Commission," Ministry of Finance, Japan, September 26, 2019, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/tax_policy/tax_commission/index.htm.
[70]Mishima, "A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins?" 1109.

options for both the LDP and DPJ when it came to removing a vast majority of nuclear energy from Japan's overall energy mix, but they took slightly different turns when it came to renewables.

The DPJ shifted their focus on renewables after the Fukushima disaster, shown by Buchholz's chart on Japan's power makeup after Fukushima.[71] Abe focused more so on lessening the cost of energy for the consumer, rather than making energy renewable. He did this by promoting coal and hydrogen cell energy sources respectively.[72] Coal was the economically efficient part of Abe's energy plan. Hydrogen cells were his alternative to promote the growth of other renewables. Therefore, while the LDP and DPJ agreed on nuclear power before the Fukushima disaster, as shown by increasing nuclear energy, they had a split afterwards.[73] In dealing with the bureaucracy and bureaucrats, the DPJ allowed for one of the latter to take the reins of government.

In its attempts to purge the bureaucrats from policy, the DPJ managed to promote one of them to prime minister Noda. While Abe controlled the bureaucracy through legislation in his second term, in his first term as well as Fukuda and Aso's terms, let it run loose and destroy the LDP. In this sense, the DPJ became the pre-2009 LDP.

In welfare policy, the LDP and DPJ had sharp differences. Since 2009, welfare payments in Japan have increased due to the DPJ's policies, but then stagnating under the LDP. Before 2009, the LDP was less inclined to promote social welfare, but rather public works projects. Japanese economic growth was high enough pre-2008 that the LDP did not have to worry too much about making sure that the social safety net was high.

[71]Buchholz, "How Fukushima Changed Japan's Energy Mix."
[72]Hoshi and Lipscy, *The Political Economy of the Abe Government,* 454, 465.
[73]Buchholz, "How Fukushima Changed Japan's Energy Mix."

Once the financial crisis of 2008 spread around the world, there was more pressure for social welfare. The DPJ tackled this pressure with childcare subsidies as shown earlier during even the tenure of Noda, the most right-leaning of the three DPJ prime ministers.[74] Since the DPJ's time in office, there has been little to no investment under Abe's administration into welfare, but rather a focus on overall economic conditions to improve economic conditions for families.[75] With Kan's reversion and Noda's limited legislation, this indicated a shift towards the right, going against their original policy promises on welfare in 2009. Stances towards the US military in Japan, especially about the Okinawa base issue, began another one of the DPJ's major backpedaling operations on major policy issues.

Under the LDP from 2006-2009, the issue of both Okinawa and the US' military presence were not important enough to be the primary issue for any prime minister; but under the DPJ it became one of their core policy agendas, more specifically the relocation of the Futenma air base. The DPJ took more of a hardline stance, or what could be called an alliance equality stance, against the US' military presence while the LDP did not challenge it. The reversion to the LDP hard stance against neighbors and lack of focus on US military bases under Noda's administration demonstrates that the DPJ took one step forward and two steps back when it came to its stance both towards US troops in Japan, especially the equality in the alliance, and its territorial sovereignty. In terms of other disputes, the LDP went to extreme lengths to retract former statements of apology and work with other states.

[74]Hoshi and Lipscy, *The Political Economy of the Abe Government,* 315.
[75]Dae Kyu Lee, "Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Two Administrations: Successes and Failures of Domestic and Security Policies," *Defense Technical Information Center* (thesis, United States Government, 2016), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1031033, 7.

Noda's purchase and nationalization of the Senkaku Islands shows that he was closer to LDP policies than the Hatoyama or Kan. While it can be argued that it was due to Tokyo mayor Ishihara's attempted purchase, his status as a former bureaucrat and his love by the right of the DPJ paints a different portrait. Abe, while on the campaign trail towards his 2012 win, stated he may retract apologies such as the Kono Statement on comfort women and would take a hard stance against the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, a reversion of conciliatory measures under Hatoyama with neighbors, but more in line with Noda's actions near the end of the DPJ.[76] One of Abe's most inflaming incidents with Japan's neighbors is when he visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war criminals' souls are enshrined, showing a possible lack of respect towards the other nations, or at least a miscalculation of any potential benefits.[77]

Overall, there were many differences between the DPJ and LDP until around 2007 when Naoto Kan took over, but slowly over each administration's tenure in office the DPJ became more like the LDP. Increasing welfare, a core goal of the original DPJ manifesto, had become almost an afterthought by the time of Noda's administration, with Abe later focusing on the economy rather than welfare which could assist those left behind in society. Over time, the DPJ slowly shifted towards Abe's policy, that being welfare through economic growth. While not necessarily the fault of the DPJ, the party shifted towards renewable energy during Kan's administration. Noda shifted right yet again with his own support for nuclear power immediately after Kan. Regarding the bureaucracy, the DPJ began their time in power with their own system of controlling the bureaucracy through shifting power to politically appointed and isolated ministers, crippling their administration's projects through a lack of field-based expertise, showing a stark contrast between

[76]Yakushiji, "Abe and the Triumph of the Old LDP."
[77]Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, "Japan PM Shinzo Abe Visits Yasukuni WW2 Shrine," BBC, December 26, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25517205.

Abe's version and Hatoyama's versions of bureaucratic control. On top of this, Noda, the last DPJ prime minister, was a bureaucrat which showed yet again another shift to the right by the DPJ on their own promises to remove bureaucratic influence. Last but not least, the foreign policy of Japan under the DPJ shifted from attempting to challenge inequities in the U.S.-Japan Alliance to that of resisting rising tensions with its neighbors, specifically the ROK and China, something that Abe did with his own visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. In the end, the DPJ looked more like the LDP by the end of its time in power; the question is, what implications does this have for the modern Japanese political scene?

2024 LDP and CDP

While not mentioning the administrations of Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, as Abe's own transformation of the LDP already demonstrated how the LDP changed after the DPJ, it is important to apply the logic of the DPJ transformation to the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and see what lessons it can use against the LDP, especially with both parties' new leadership. Winning their respective leadership races, Shigeru Ishiba and Yoshihiko Noda, the latter being the former DPJ Prime Minister, have become leaders of the LDP and CDP respectively.[78] The recent election tested Ishiba's strength, especially due to his narrow margin of victory against Takaichi, and he failed the test.[79] Now with the general election and Diet election over, it is crucial to analyze what the policies of each party and its leaders are, specifically related to the bureaucracy, welfare, energy, and foreign policy, and then to compare them to their most recent counterparts, possibly charting the paths of both parties going forward. While the

[78]*The Asahi Shimbun*, "Noda Wins Presidential Election of Main Opposition CDP;" "【kuwashiku】Jimin Shin Sōsai Ni Ishiba Shigeru Shi Takaichi Shi o Osae Senshutsu," NHK, September 28, 2024, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240927/k10014593201000.html.
[79]Ibid; Mari Yamaguchi, "Japan's New PM Dissolves the Lower House of Parliament to Set up a Snap Election," AP News, October 9, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/japan-politics-ishiba-pariament-dissolution-election-6e7ffd74ff17e263b8aea1283f0afbe8.

government structure and reforms will not be analyzed, as they are yet to have occurred in earnest, specifically the uncertainty over the fate of factions in both parties due to the November 2023 LDP fundraising scandal, the opinions of both candidates should be compared both in terms of interparty and intraparty differences.[80]

Policies of the LDP and CDP

Bureaucracy

Starting with the bureaucracy, both Ishiba and Noda seem to be moderates when it comes to bureaucratic influence within the government. Ishiba has not yet challenged the bureaucracy and seems to be going steady with the policies of Fumio Kishida, his predecessor.[81] As mentioned in the beginning, the man he chose to be Secretary General of the LDP was a postal rebel, someone who stood up against the reforms of Koizumi, showing that Ishiba may not be as open to reform as some may gather. It should be said that Ishiba, to stay in power after the election, may be shifting towards a policy of genuine political reform, but it is too early to tell.[82] Noda seems to be of a same or similar mind; being a former bureaucrat, and having appointed a bureaucrat to his shadow cabinet, he has shown the about-face which the DPJ had taken after Yukio Hatoyama's time in

[80]Serikawa Yōichi, "Emerging from Abe's Long Shadow: Change Looms for Japan's Ruling LDP," Nippon.com, September 20, 2024, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01037/; The Japan News, "7 Party Leaders Debate Reforms Ahead of Campaign," The Japan News, October 13, 2024, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/election/20241013-216424/.
[81]Alyssa Chen, "Who Is Shigeru Ishiba, Japan's Leader in Waiting, and What Will He Bring to China Ties?," South China Morning Post, September 28, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3280323/who-shigeru-ishiba-japans-leader-waiting-and-what-will-he-bring-china-ties.
[82]Gabriele Ninivaggi, "Ishiba's Minority Government Begins First Day of Business with Focus on Reform," The Japan Times, November 12, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/11/12/japan/politics/ishiba-political-funds/?utm_source=pianodnu&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=72&tpcc=dnu&pnespid=_lwcyooe7rxl9rwroxyq4.sv5w0s_zr_majxeltqubavcr2iadlsmzkwc0.hoju9nr6bn513.

office.[83] In total, at this moment in time, both parties seem set to have minimal changes towards the bureaucracy, something that appears to be similar to their stances on welfare.

Welfare

Regarding welfare, Ishiba has been advocating for a tax increase, something that Noda himself campaigned for during his time in office. While Ishiba stated that he was willing to raise corporate taxes, he has now ruled out increases on the capital gains tax and may rule out more if it jeopardizes Japan's economic stability or Ishiba's pro-Abenomics Finance Minister Kato's goal to fight deflation.[84] The purpose of the possible tax increases seems to be to support the welfare system as well as new policies set up by Fumio Kishida, such as cash handouts.[85] While Noda has not called for tax increases, as it would almost certainly cripple the CDP's chances at winning the election, he has stated that the status quo should be maintained, rather than reducing taxes.[86] On the specifics of welfare, he has not clearly stated any policies, but it is more than likely he will continue to, at the very least, consider tax increases to fund the current system. Slight differences are apparent in the policies of Ishiba and Noda, but overall, their end results are nearly the same, stabilizing the economy while keeping the welfare system at its current levels.

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[83]"New Japan Opposition Leader Noda Unveils Party Executive Lineup," The Mainichi, September 24, 2024, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20240924/p2g/00m/0na/047000c.
[84]Reuters, "Japan PM Hopeful Ishiba Sees 'room' for Corporate Tax Hike, Kyodo Reports," Reuters, September 21, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/japan/japan-pm-hopeful-ishiba-sees-room-corporate-tax-hike-kyodo-reports-2024-09-22/; Reuters, "Japan PM Ishiba Rules out Hike in Capital Gains Tax," Reuters, October 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/japan-pm-ishiba-rules-out-hike-capital-gains-tax-2024-10-07/; Yuki Yamaguchi, "FOCUS: New PM Ishiba's Tax Rise Plan Could Disrupt BOJ Rate Hike Path," Kyodo News, October 3, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/c3721b25846a-focus-new-pm-ishibas-tax-rise-plan-could-disrupt-boj-rate-hike-path.html; Kazuaki Nagata, "Japan's New Finance Minister Vows to Finish the Job as Deflation Czar," The Japan Times, October 7, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2024/10/07/economy/new-finance-minister-kato/.
[85]Reito Kaneko, "Inflation-Hit Voters in Japan Hope for Higher Wages," Kyodo News, October 9, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/28c91c33fa05-inflation-hit-voters-in-japan-hope-for-higher-wages.html.
[86]The Yomiuri Shimbun, "Ex-PM Yoshihiko Noda Announces Candidacy for CDPJ Leadership Race," The Yomiuri Shimbun, August 29, 2024, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20240829-208156/.

Energy

Moving to the topic of energy, Noda and Ishiba disagree heavily on the composition of Japan's long term energy plans. While their personal views on nuclear energy are very hard to discern, their parties have completely opposite views about nuclear energy and its role in Japanese society. Starting with Ishiba, both he and his party promote keeping nuclear energy as a power source, while also increasing renewables.[87] There is slight debate as to whether Ishiba believes in a nuclear-free society or not, but a likely possibility is that he is promoting the policy to gain voters.[88] Noda, on the other hand, has not called for a nuclear-free society, possibly for political reasons, even though his own party stresses its importance.[89] Their differing stances on nuclear energy show how the CDP seems more like the pre-2009 LDP rather than the DPJ, and how the LDP now seems to be championing the policies of the DPJ during its time in power, which is a radical shift, and one that may cost the CDP votes.

Foreign Policy

Last, but most certainly not least, the LDP and CDP seem to have very different positions regarding foreign affairs. While the DPJ once championed equality in the alliance, the LDP has since co-opted their stance, but also keeping in line with the LDP's policy of expanding military usage, the latter of which the CDP argues against. Ishiba's paper at the Hudson Institute promotes more equality in the US-Japan Alliance, allowing for the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) to

[87]Katya Golubkova, "Japan to Keep Nuclear, Boost Renewables in Its Energy Mix, New Industry Minister Says," Reuters, October 2, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/japan/japan-keep-nuclear-boost-renewables-its-energy-mix-new-industry-minister-says-2024-10-02/.
[88]Ibid; Shigesaboru Okumura, "Japan PM Ishiba Eyes More Renewables, Less Nuclear in Energy Mix," Nikkei Asia, October 12, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Japan-s-Ishiba-eyes-more-renewables-and-less-nuclear-in-energy-mix.
[89]"EDITORIAL: Will Noda Be Able to Convince Voters That CDP Is Fit to Govern?" The Asahi Shimbun, September 24, 2024, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15437601.

train on US territory, such as Guam, and possibly to start nuclear sharing with the US. He also agrees with Kishida and Abe's choices to both increase usage scenarios of the JSDF and to increase the budget of the JSDF respectively. Moreover, he has promoted the idea of an "Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)," a collective security agreement within East Asia, meaning each nation will defend the other.[90] It is important to keep in mind that Ishiba has now downplayed the idea of an Asian NATO, especially in his first overseas trip[91]. Even with his goals of shifting the US-Japan Alliance, the idea of nuclear sharing that would make Japan a nuclear power by proxy, shows that he wishes to strengthen it. He has also contemplated meeting with whomever would be elected to the White House.[92] After the election of Donald Trump, it is unclear whether or not any plans will go ahead, especially with Trump's "America First" policy[93].

While Noda may not agree with the idea of increasing military usage, in fact wanting to restrain collective self-defense in terms of defending both Japanese and allied forces in combat situations, he has called for a stronger US-Japan Alliance, possibly even making it more equal like Shigeru Ishiba wishes to.[94] As of writing, Noda seems more focused on domestic rather than foreign policy issues, such as the upcoming election.[95] The core idea of realigning the US-Japan

[90]Shigeru Ishiba, "Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy," The Hudson Institute, September 25, 2024, https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/shigeru-ishiba-japans-new-security-era-future-japans-foreign-policy.
[91]Keita Nakamura, "FOCUS: Japan PM Ishiba Opts for Pragmatic Diplomacy, No Talk of Asian NATO," Kyodo News, October 13, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/34f18b53c7c6-focus-japan-pm-ishiba-opts-for-pragmatic-diplomacy-no-talk-of-asian-nato.html.
[92]The Yomiuri Shimbun, "Japan's Prime Minister Ishiba Considering Meeting with U.S. President-Elect; Seeks to Stabilize, Deepen Japan-U.S. Alliance," The Japan News, October 13, 2024, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20241013-216429/.
[93]Keita Nakamura, "FOCUS: Trump Win to Dampen Japan PM's Ambitions for U.S. Troop Pact Change," Kyodo News, November 7, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/11/01cdfad3f98a-focus-trump-win-to-dampen-japan-pms-ambitions-for-us-troop-pact-change.html.
[94]"Noda's Election As CDPJ Leader: Can New President Build Party Unity with Centrist Approach?" The Japan News, September 24, 2024, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/yomiuri-editorial/20240924-213119/.
[95]"Japan PM Grilled over Flip-Flop in 1st Diet Debate with Opposition," Kyodo News, October 7, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/b1d1f19e4043-pm-defends-his-diet-dissolution-plan-in-1st-debate-with-opposition.html#google_vignette.

Alliance would be comparable to the beginning of the DPJ's term in office, while the CDP has maintained the idea of a pacifist state rather than expanding the JSDF's usage parameters. Both leaders, while their overarching ideals may be clear, both lack details when it comes to implementation of their policies, especially after Noda's debate with other party leaders where he failed to specify what security legislation is unconstitutional while also saying that the US-Japan Alliance is crucial to both Japan and the US.[96] Dealing with Northeast Asian neighbors, the LDP and CDP are oddly in consensus unlike with handling the US-Japan Alliance, more specifically within their parties, albeit there is a caveat in the case of the LDP.

Regarding stances towards China and other Northeast Asian neighbors, Ishiba and Noda seem to agree on the fundamentals, with specific policies only being applicable in the future for further study. At this moment, Ishiba is attempting to forge amicable relationships with Japan's neighbors, specifically China.[97] What Noda would do can only be judged by what he has done in the past, most notably nationalizing the Senkaku Islands which, while angering China, did prevent their purchase by the ultranationalist Governor of Tokyo. As of writing, it is still too early to tell how relations may change under an Ishiba, or even possibly a second Noda administration, especially within the first 100 days. For Ishiba, it may be safe to assume that he will follow Kishida's policies, as he is with welfare and taxes, but it is still hard to tell.

Election Influence

[96]The Yomiuri Shimbun, "CDPJ's Noda Stresses His Pragmatism at Debate, Says Diplomacy as PM Would Center on Japan-U.S. Relationship," The Japan News, October 13, 2024, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20241013-216475/.
[97]Gabriel Dominguez and Francis Tang, "Ishiba Keeps Low Profile as He Makes Diplomatic Debut," The Japan Times, October 10, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/10/10/japan/politics/japan-ishiba-diplomatic-debut-asean/; Alyssa Chen, "China's Li Qiang and Japanese PM Ishiba Pledge Stable Ties in First Meeting," South China Morning Post, October 11, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3281969/chinas-li-qiang-and-japanese-pm-ishiba-pledge-stable-ties-first-meeting.

Last but certainly not least, the election helped to solidify the differences between the CDP and LDP, with financial scandals hitting the LDP until the very last moment. At first, it was unclear whether or not the LDP would be endorsing candidates for office who had been involved with the November 2023 financial scandal.[98] Ishiba decided that he would deal with endorsements on a case-by-case basis but was undermined by the Secretary General of the LDP Moriyama who sent funds to factions no matter who their leader was, something the opposition claimed was a way to fund candidates who had been implicated by the scandal and later unendorsed.[99] Because of this endorsement funding scandal, as well as the November 2023 financial incident which resulted in the punishments given, the LDP lost their majority in the Diet and now rules in a minority government.[100] The importance of this is that if most opposition parties agree to go against Ishiba, they could call a vote of no confidence at any time, meaning that the LDP is on very shaky ground. Shinjiro Koizumi, son of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi as well as one of the top three contenders in the LDP primary, resigned to take accountability for the electoral loss.[101] This is in stark contrast to the CDP, which picked up 52 seats in the House of Representatives of the Diet.[102]

[98]Kyodo News, "Japan LDP Mulls Endorsing Members Punished over Scandal in Diet Race," Kyodo News, October 5, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/d5cab87f0414-japan-ldp-mulls-endorsing-members-punished-over-scandal-in-diet-race.html.
[99]Kyodo News, "Some Scandal-Hit LDP Members to Be Denied Endorsement in Election," Kyodo News, October 6, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/72ea5d909107-some-scandal-hit-ldp-members-to-be-denied-endorsement-in-election.html?phrase=surname&words=; Kyodo News, "Japan's LDP Admits to Funding Branches Led by Scandal-Hit Members," Kyodo News, October 24, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/c35ccdbcb0c8-japans-ldp-admits-to-funding-branches-led-by-scandal-hit-members.html?phrase=nobita&words=#google_vignette.
[100]Akane Okutsu, "Ishiba Hangs on as Japan PM, Will Lead Minority Government," Nikkei Asia, November 11, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ishiba-hangs-on-as-Japan-PM-will-lead-minority-government.
[101]Saori Moriguchi, "LDP Election Strategy Chief Koizumi Resigns over Party's Poor Results in Japan Election," The Mainichi, October 28, 2024, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20241028/p2a/00m/0na/017000c; Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Julia Mio Inuma, "Japan's Long-Ruling Party Loses Majority in Stunning Election Defeat," The Washington Post, October 27, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/27/japan-election-results-2024-ldp/.
[102]Ibid.

Overall Comparisons

Overall, the CDP and the LDP very much resemble the struggle for power between the DPJ and LDP, except their positions have yet again changed. Even though the CDP is considered a left-leaning party, as shown by its anti-nuclear and pro-welfare stances, the LDP has both co-opted and changed their own policies to garner more votes, much like they did against the DPJ. But it would not be fair to say that only the LDP has changed, as the CDP is less anti-bureaucrat and more pro-US than its DPJ predecessor. This is not to say that the CDP is wrong for changing, but rather to show how it has shifted somewhat towards the right, and how the LDP has co-opted both DPJ and CDP policies, preventing a strong opposition from coming to power.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, the DPJ was not the opposition party they had been in 2009 by the time 2012 rolled around. It was led by a bureaucrat, practically rebuked its 2009 manifesto, and failed to deliver on substantial reforms that it promised to constituents throughout its time in power. On top of this, they had reverted their foreign policy to LDP-like views in relation to neighbors, and they had given up their promise under Hatoyama to relocate Futenma base. In the end, these events show how an opposition party can quickly transform into what the previous ruling party had been in Japan. This is both a case study of a Japanese opposition party, but also a warning to the CDP's current trajectory. Policies the DPJ once held have been co-opted by the LDP, and the CDP's policies are more right-leaning on some issues than the LDP's own policies, specifically on welfare and even energy in some regards, showing a lack of unique policy issues to attract voters. With Noda having been elected as president of the CDP, the party may be repeating the missteps of the DPJ, becoming unappealing to opposition voters and unable to gather liberal-leaning support.

Regardless of what party holds power in the future, especially after the LDP's electoral failures, this still serves as a valuable lesson to all Japanese political parties. Shifting policies either during an administration or while taking office, even if pragmatic or to gain support for a limited time, may alienate one's own base of support enough to force them to leave office. With the LDP having lost the election, there is room to argue that the CDP's policy agenda worked in its favor, having become more "moderate", or what can be called shifting to the right. Another argument is that due to financial scandals before and during the election, the LDP was rebuked by voters rather than the CDP's policies becoming more appealing to voters, especially since the LDP still holds power, albeit as a minority government. Nevertheless, the CDP did not win a majority in both the general election and the election for prime minister in the Diet, showing a lack of widespread support. Overall, this continues to stand as a warning to opposition parties going against the LDP that if they do not keep their own set of policies unique to their party, they may lack the base of support necessary to defeat the LDP, and even then the opposition parties may lose if the LDP co-opts their policies. Even with the recent election, it will take a lot more than what the CDP just accomplished, and what the DPJ did from 2009-2012, to make a change rather than to be an aberration in the system.

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